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ARTICLES
LEGISLATIVE ARROGANCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY*
CAITLIN E. BORGMANN**

"'If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the
judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights
acquired under those judgments, the [C]onstitution itself becomes a solemn
mockery.. .."'
ABSTRACT
A movement is quietly gaining traction-state legislatures are
enacting social policy through laws specially designed to evade
constitutional review by the courts. These laws give individuals a private
right of action to seek massive damages against those who engage in
constitutionallyprotected but controversialconduct. The coercive nature of
potential, massive civil liability has the same effect as an outright ban on
constitutionally protected acts. But federal appellate courts have found
legal challenges to these laws barred by the doctrines of Article III
* © 2006 by the author. Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this
Article in whole or in part for educational or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies
for classroom use, subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation, and this
copyright notice and grant of permission be included in the copies.
** Assistant Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law; B.A., Yale
University; J.D., New York University School of Law. The author is grateful for the helpful comments
of Bebe Anderson, Albert Borgmann, John Goldberg, Laurence Helfer, Sylvia Law, Steven Loffredo,
John Lovi, Ruthann Robson, Sharon Rush, Priscilla Smith, Suja Thomas, and participants in faculty
forums at CUNY Law School and Fordham Law School.
1. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
115, 136 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.)).
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standing and state sovereign immunity. The resulting legislative arrogation
of power is a dangerous trend, forewarned of by the Framers of the
Constitution. It contravenes federal supremacy and upsets the balance of
power among coordinate branches of government. This Article argues that
the courts can address this new phenomenon based on time-honored
constitutionalprinciples and a long-overdue reevaluation of the doctrine of
Ex parte Young.
I. INTRODUCTION
Denouncing the judiciary is in vogue among elected officials.2
Legislators across the political spectrum have proposed tactics to divest a
supposedly runaway, activist judiciary of its independence and its capacity
to check legislative actions. These strategies have been widely discussed
and include measures such as "court-stripping" provisions 3 or directives
that limit how courts can rule on particular issues.4 Such legislative tactics,
however, are themselves subject to immediate constitutional scrutiny by
federal courts.5 The constitutional structure is thus designed to rein in the
2.

The criticisms are also prevalent within the legal academy and the media. See generally, e.g.,

LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

(2004) (law professor arguing that the Constitution was enacted to reflect the popular ideals of the
people); MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT Is DESTROYING AMERICA (2005)
(conservative talk show host arguing that the Constitution is under siege by judicial activists); MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (law professor arguing for a
populist view of constitutional interpretation rather than strict judicial supremacy). And the criticisms
are not new. See, e.g., Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 78-79 (D. Mass. 2005) (discussing
contemporary attacks on judicial review and observing that "[v]erbal and political attacks on an
independent federal judiciary are as old as the republic").
3. See, e.g., Pledge Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (divesting
federal courts of jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance);
Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. §§ 101-02 (2005) (eliminating federal court
jurisdiction over cases brought against governments or government agents based on their
"acknowledgement of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government"); Marriage
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (divesting federal courts of jurisdiction to
determine the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act).
4. See, e.g., S. 520 § 201 (prohibiting federal courts from relying on international law in
interpreting the Constitution). This bill was introduced by Senators Shelby, Brownback, and Burr three
days after the Supreme Court invoked international law in support of a decision to declare
unconstitutional the application of the death penalty to juvenile offenders. See id.; Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005). State legislatures have imposed similar limitations on state courts'
independence through constitutional amendments. See infra notes 314-317 and accompanying text
(discussing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
5. See, e.g., Ira Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Regulations Clause: Legislative
Attempts to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction,32 AM. U. L. REV. 497 (1983) (arguing
that congressional court-stripping bills are unconstitutional). Although Congress can, of course, propose
federal constitutional amendments, the difficult amendment process offers its own check on legislative
overreaching.
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6
most aggressive examples of legislative overreaching.

Recently, however, a potent and more insidious form of legislative
defiance has emerged-one that is specifically designed to escape judicial
review. In this new iteration, state legislatures have burdened or suppressed
constitutionally protected conduct, not by banning the targeted conduct
outright, but by creating the risk of massive civil liability for engaging in it.
These laws eliminate any official enforcement role for the state, so that
those subject to liability have no one to sue to prevent the laws'
enforcement. By making it sufficiently costly to engage in the targeted
conduct, these statutes effectively suppress the conduct before the
constitutional issues can be addressed by the courts.
These laws pose a dangerous affront to two basic constitutional
principles: the proper division of authority between federal and state
government, and the proper distribution of power between the judicial and
legislative branches. They invoke the prospect of a "hydra in
government"-forewarned of in the Federalist Papers-in which the
"authority of the whole society" is "subordinate to the authority of the
parts." 8 I refer to state legislative defiance of the federal judiciary as
"legislative arrogance." 9 In this new, insidious incarnation, states flout the
Court's pronouncements about what the Constitution means and
simultaneously design their enactments to escape judicial review. State
legislatures thus arrogate authority by removing constitutionally
questionable legislative actions from judicial scrutiny altogether. These
laws purport to empower the public by creating a private cause of action to
redress a perceived harm. In fact, they are power grabs by state legislatures
frustrated with constitutional constraints imposed by an independent
judiciary. Because the absence of state enforcement precludes preenforcement court challenges, state legislatures can use this paradigm to
6. See, e.g., infra notes 194, 314-317 and accompanying text (discussing Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996)).
7. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison), supra note 7, at 231 (referring to the "monster"
of state authority superseding federal power).
9. "Arrogance" is the act of "unduly appropriating authority or importance," and stems from the
Latin word arrogare (to claim for oneself). See NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 119
(Oxford Univ. Press 1992). Legislative arrogance can be limited to the state level, where state
legislatures defy unpopular decisions by a state's high court. Similarly, it can exist purely at the federal
level, through congressional defiance of Supreme Court rulings. This Article focuses on state legislative
defiance of the federal judiciary. This particular kind of legislative arrogance is especially significant
because it implicates not only the proper distribution of power among the constitutional actors in our
system of government, but also the issue of federal supremacy.
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constitutionally

So far, the tactic has been largely confined to the abortion context;
however, its potential reach is far broader. At least two states have
circumvented the Supreme Court's reaffirmations of a woman's right to
abortion by passing laws that create private rights of action, with strict
liability and massive potential damages, against abortion providers. 10 Preenforcement challenges have been unavailing: the Fifth and Tenth Circuits
each claimed to be powerless when confronted with challenges to the laws.
Because the states play no official role in the legislative schemes beyond
having enacted the statutes, both courts found the suits barred by the
doctrine of Article HI standing." Half of the Fifth Circuit, which ruled en
12
banc, also found that sovereign immunity protected Louisiana from suit.
State legislative arrogance raises unique concerns which courts should
address head-on. State enactments that directly defy Supreme Court rulings
and evade federal court review invite a breakdown of a uniform system of
federal rights. An anarchy results in which each state-directed by popular
will that may be overtly hostile to the rights of minorities--determines for
itself what the "supreme law of the land" says. To permit defiant state
legislatures to circumvent the judicial process through shrewd legislative

drafting is to contemplate an entirely different form of government: one
that posits that state government is equal or superior in authority to the
federal government, and one in which the legislative branch is virtually
unchecked by the judicial branch. The prospect of such a "hydra in
government" 13 should trouble even those who favor a sharply curtailed role
10. Louisiana has imposed essentially unlimited tort liability on abortion providers generally. See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12 (Supp. 2006); discussion infra Part III.A. Oklahoma's measure is
more narrowly aimed at those who provide abortions to minors by creating a cause of action against
those who fail to require parental consent. See OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740 (West 2004). In May
2005, Oklahoma's measure was revised to limit its application to unemancipated minors and to offer a
constitutionally required judicial bypass option. See id. §§ 1-740.1 to -740.3 (West Supp. 2006).
Oklahoma additionally criminalized conducting such abortions as a misdemeanor. Id. § 1-740.4;
discussion infra Part LH.B.
11.
See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 388 F.3d 744, 755 (10th Cir. 2004); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244
F.3d 405, 425-27 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
12. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 408, 409, 411-16. A Louisiana appellate court later ordered a state
court challenge to be dismissed on the grounds that no justiciable controversy existed between the
plaintiffs and the State of Louisiana. Women's Health Clinic v. State, 825 So. 2d 1208, 1210-12 (La.
Ct. App. 2002).
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 7, at 403.
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for the federal courts and increased state power. 14 Moreover, the problem
should worry both political parties, because there is no limit to the nature of
the social policies that legislative arrogance could be used to advance.' 5 In
the face of the decisions by the Fifth and Tenth Circuits dismissing
challenges to these laws, state legislatures are likely to attempt even bolder
acts of defiance.
This Article argues for a reinstatement of constitutional
accountability 16 in the context of self-enforcing state legislation that
infringes on constitutional rights. Holding state legislatures constitutionally
accountable in these instances requires no more than a straightforward
application of Article III case or controversy principles and a logical
extension of the doctrine of Ex parte Young. 17 Part II of the Article
sketches out the basic problem in greater detail, discussing the
characteristics of and concerns raised by laws that implement
constitutionally questionable social policy through private enforcement
schemes. Part I describes the two recent cases in which federal appellate
courts have reviewed challenges to such laws and rejected them on Article
III standing or sovereign immunity grounds. Part III then critiques the legal
reasoning employed by those courts, concluding that the doctrines of
standing and sovereign immunity do not preclude pre-enforcement review
of these statutes. Finally, Part IV steps back and considers the broader
constitutional principles implicated by state acts of legislative arrogance. It
argues that pre-enforcement challenges to these laws are supported by a
proper regard for federal supremacy and the appropriate balance of power
14. This Article does not grapple with how fundamental rights are properly determined. It does
presume that once the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right, state legislatures are bound
by that determination.
15. The Louisiana and Oklahoma statutes echo a tort liability scheme intended to prevent
pornography that was proposed in Massachusetts in 1992. See H.R. 5194, 1992 Legis. Sess. (Mass.
1992). The Massachusetts bill, which was never passed, implicated the free speech rights of publishers,
booksellers, and others. It would have given a private cause of action against these parties to women
harmed by pornography. See id. § 2. See also infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing the
Massachusetts bill). For further examples of potential legislative policymaking, see infra notes 31-35
and accompanying text.
16. By "constitutional accountability" I mean fidelity to core constitutional principles and the
acceptance by a constitutional actor of its own place, and that of others, within the constitutional
structure. Guido Calabresi has used the term in discussing the propensity of legislatures to shirk
constitutional responsibility in other contexts. See Guido Calabresi, Foreword:Antidiscrimination and
ConstitutionalAccountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 104

(1991) (referring to these instances as "failures of 'constitutional accountability"'). See also Gillian E.
Metzger, Privatizationas Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003) (discussing how legislatures
avoid constitutional accountability through privatization).
17. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (establishing an
exception to state sovereign immunity).
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between the legislative and judicial branches. Part IV also examines the
Supreme Court's recent treatment of these constitutional principles and
hypothesizes that the Court would likely uphold federal courts' authority to
consider challenges to state legislative arrogance.
II. DUCKING THE CHALLENGE: THE USE OF TORT LAW TO
INSULATE CONSTITUTIONALLY SUSPECT SOCIAL POLICY
FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW
Proposals for privately enforced laws that directly contradict wellestablished constitutional precedents are not new, although their deliberate
use as a means of evading judicial review appears to be a nascent
development. In the mid-1980s, Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin proposed a novel way to address the harms they believed
pornography inflicted on women. 18 Their idea was to hold all persons
involved in the production and distribution of pornographic material civilly
liable to those who claimed to be harmed by the pornography. This
contrasted with the traditional course of making government the sole
enforcer of pornography restrictions. MacKinnon and Dworkin's proposal
hit a roadblock, however, when the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
invalidated one such ordinance enacted in Indianapolis. In American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, the Seventh Circuit held that the ordinance

unconstitutionally restrained free speech. 19 The ordinance gave some
enforcement role to the local government: complaints were to be filed with
the city, which was charged with investigating the complaints, resolving
disputes through informal and formal proceedings, and enforcing
determinations of the proceedings. City officials could also seek judicial
enforcement of their decision. 20 When several trade associations and other
plaintiffs2 1

sued

individual

Indianapolis

officials

responsible

for

implementing the ordinance, no judge questioned the existence of a case or
controversy with these defendants.
18.
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCE Nos. 1983-OR-139, 141 (1983), available in IN HARM'S
WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS 426-32 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Andrea

Dworkin eds., 1997) [hereinafter INHARM'S WAY].
19. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-32 (7th Cir. 1985), affid, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
20. See Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1321-25 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
21. The plaintiffs included trade associations for booksellers, publishers, periodical distributors,
and college stores; businesses engaged in distributing and selling books, periodicals, videos, and
television programming; an individual reader; and the Freedom to Read Foundation (a nonprofit
organization). Id. at 1319.
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In 1992, the Massachusetts House of Representatives took up a
second-generation proposal, which eliminated any enforcement role for the
government. Instead, the bill permitted "[a]ny woman... acting against the
subordination of women," as well as "[a]ny man, child, or transsexual who
alleges injury by pornography in the way women are injured by it," to
"complain directly to a court of competent jurisdiction for relief," including
an injunction and nominal, compensatory, or punitive damages. 22 The
Massachusetts House held a hearing on the bill, which was entitled "An
Act to Protect the Civil Rights of Women and Children." 23 The fervent
debate included the testimony of opponents who worried about the
proposed law's chilling effect on free speech and on the sale of books,
24
movies, and videos.
Had the Massachusetts bill been enacted, the same kinds of
individuals and entities who sued to enjoin the Indianapolis ordinance in
Hudnut surely would have challenged the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts bill. Rather than wait to be sued for potentially catastrophic
damages (or desist entirely from conduct they believed to be
constitutionally protected), these content producers would have wanted to
bring a preemptive action to have the law declared unconstitutional and
enjoin its enforcement. But whom would they have sued? The only actual
"enforcers" of this law would have been individual private citizens. How
could the challengers possibly predict who would sue them in order to
enjoin any such suit? But, without a pre-enforcement challenge, would the
legislation not achieve its goal by chilling the speech of those who did not
dare risk liability?
Massachusetts failed to enact MacKinnon and Dworkin's statute, so
potential challengers to the law never faced these questions. But, abortion
providers in Louisiana and Oklahoma have recently confronted these
precise questions in seeking to challenge privately enforced liability
schemes.2 5 And the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have essentially answered that
22. See H.R. 5194 §§ 2, 4, 1992 Legis. Sess. (Mass. 1992). In describing differences between the
Massachusetts bill and the Indianapolis ordinance during a committee hearing in the Massachusetts
House of Representatives, William Hudnut, former mayor of Indianapolis, confirmed "that the
Indianapolis ordinance required people to go with their complaint to our Equal Employment Office and
then, if that office wanted to take it to a court, they could," whereas under the Massachusetts bill "they
are given the right to take it directly to court." IN HARM's WAY, supra note 18, at 365.
23. See An Act to Protectthe Civil Rights of Women and Children:Hearing on H.R. 5194 Before
the Committee of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1992 Legis. Sess. (Mass. 1992), transcript
available in IN HARM'S WAY, supra note 18, at 361-416.
24. See IN HARM'S WAY, supra note 18, at 395, 399,404.
25. See supra note 10 (discussing the Louisiana and Oklahoma statutes, respectively).
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the providers are without a remedy. Subjected to laws that appear almost
certainly unconstitutional,2 6 the providers nevertheless have not heard their
claims addressed because courts have found no case or controversy
between them and the defendants named in the lawsuits. 27 Half of the
judges on the Fifth Circuit also concluded that the doctrine of sovereign
28
immunity shielded the state of Louisiana from suit.
That this legislative vehicle has thus far been employed mainly in the
context of abortion is of little consequence. The Louisiana and Oklahoma
statutes are notable because they are manifestations of a paradigmatic selfenforcing law that states could adopt to avoid pre-enforcement
constitutional challenges in a wide array of contexts. The paradigm
comprises the following features: (1) it regulates a hot-button social issue;
(2) it addresses the issue in a way the state has reason to think may be (or
knows is) unconstitutional; and (3) it creates a private cause of action with
two elements that make it highly risky not to comply, open-ended or
potentially catastrophic damages and strict liability (or an easy threshold
for such damages). Through this kind of statute, a state lets the prospect of
private lawsuits stand in for the threat of criminal or other state
enforcement. In Louisiana, this key feature made possible what the state
tried unsuccessfully for years to achieve, a law that imposes
unconstitutional burdens on the provision of abortion services and that has
remained in effect because no one has been granted standing to challenge
it. 29 A similar Oklahoma law caused abortion providers to implement
30
changes in their policies that the state could never have imposed directly.
This paradigm could be employed to achieve any number of other
state goals across the political spectrum. The antipornography proposals of
MacKinnon and Dworkin only offer one illustration. As another example,
many state legislatures have recently proposed bills that would institute
special grievance procedures for students who believe their professors are
teaching in a biased manner. 3 These bills could be retooled slightly to
26. See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 388 F.3d 744, 750, 755 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that
abortion providers suffered an injury in fact but had no standing in federal court); Okpalobi v. Foster,
244 F.3d 405, 425-27 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (noting that abortion providers suffered a "coercive
effect" but did not have standing in federal court).
27. See Nova Health Sys., 388 F.3d at 755; Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 425-27.
28. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 411-16.
29. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12 (Supp. 2006); infra Part lI.A.
30. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740 (West 2004); infra Part 1I.B.
31. See, e.g., S. 1988, 84th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2005-06); S. 24, 126th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2005);
S. 5, 2003-05 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). See also Sara Hebel, PatrollingProfessors' Politics, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 13, 2004 (describing proposals); Michael Janofsky, Professors' Politics Draw
Lawmakers into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, §1, at 22 (same).
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allow the students to sue professors in court.3 2 Similarly, states could
impose freestanding, "abstinence-only" requirements on sexuality
education in schools 33 or libraries by giving a private cause of action to any
parent whose child received information about contraception or other
objectionable topics from such an entity. A creationism or "intelligent
design" requirement offers a variation on this example. Likewise,
legislatures could inhibit the sale of guns by imposing huge damage awards
against gun manufacturers, distributors, and retailers for any harm caused
by a gun. 34 Or a state could pass a law allowing defamation liability that
clearly violates New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,35 by imposing strict
liability for making a false statement, and even for the mere sale or
distribution of material containing such a statement. One can transform
unconstitutional
statutes
into
self-enforcing,
but
apparently
unchallengeable, laws simply by substituting massive tort liability for
criminal penalties or fines in statutes found to violate constitutional rights.
In each of these examples, the only way for those targeted by the
legislation to challenge its constitutionality would be to wait until they
themselves were sued under the law's provisions. Those unwilling to
continue their activities under a cloud of potential catastrophic financial
and other consequences would simply cease to engage in the conduct,
despite their belief that the restriction violated their constitutional rights.
Abortion restrictions provide a helpful context in which to consider
the likely effects of such a law in greater detail. Assume a state has five
medical facilities that provide abortions. 36 The state passes a law that
imposes strict tort liability for performing abortions. Two facilities
immediately stop providing abortions due to the economic risk. Two others
32.
Presumably, under the current proposals, professors could challenge such laws by suing the
universities, who are responsible for implementing the grievance procedures. See, e.g., S. 24, 126th
Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2005); S. 5, 2003-05 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
33.
Abstinence-only education requirements are currently imposed as conditions placed upon
certain federal funding streams. See, e.g., Adolescent Family Life Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to 300z-10

(2000).
34. Such a law might be argued to be unconstitutional under a dormant commerce clause theory,
claiming that the state unconstitutionally interfered with interstate commerce. Cf Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of
Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 278, 290-91 (6th Cir. 1997) (describing pre-enforcement claims brought
against gun control provisions of the federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
and the justiciability of challenging the Act on Commerce Clause grounds).
35. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment
requires proof of "actual malice" in order to recover damages in claims of defamation).
36.
The United States is experiencing a widespread scarcity of abortion providers. See Caitlin
Borgmann & Catherine Weiss, Beyond Apocalypse & Apology: A Moral Defense of Abortion, 35
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 40, 40 & n.3 (2003) (citing study showing that 87% of all

counties in the nation lack abortion providers and listing factors contributing to the scarcity).
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quietly continue providing abortions, hoping they will not be sued. The
final provider openly defies the law and vows to fight it. An antichoice
group finds a plaintiff, who brings a private lawsuit under the act. The
group chooses the defendants opportunistically-suing the two tentative
providers, but not the defiant one, who would mount an aggressive defense
to challenge the statute's constitutionality. The defendant providers
immediately cut their losses by agreeing to stop providing abortions.
Antichoice legislatures and advocates have now succeeded in eliminating
eighty percent of the abortion providers in the state, without a court ever
addressing the statute's constitutional infirmities.
The problem with these laws, then, is that they may well succeed in
getting many, if not most, in a targeted group to stop engaging in protected
conduct merely because most individuals are risk averse. From a financial
perspective, many organizations are either unwilling or unable to risk
losing a constitutional challenge and incurring massive liability, however
remote the risk. Even if those who are risk neutral continue to engage in the
conduct, it will take years before a lawsuit settles the constitutional issues.
In the meantime, the constitutionally protected acts of others are chilled.37
Should states be permitted to duck constitutional challenges to
legislatively enacted policies simply by tinkering with penalties to shift the
enforcement role from the state to private parties? Should they be allowed
to use the shield of Article Ill standing requirements and sovereign
immunity as a sword to enact punitive and unconstitutional policies that
would never withstand pre-enforcement constitutional challenges? The
Fifth and Tenth Circuits have effectively answered "yes."
37. This is precisely what happened in Oklahoma. See infra note 102 and accompanying text
(discussing the chilling effect Oklahoma's statute had on the availability of abortions in the state). It is
possible that, because liability under these kinds of laws is purely monetary, market incentives will
produce protection in the form of insurance. In Louisiana, the abortion law was specifically written to
undermine this possibility, as it eliminated the applicability of the state's malpractice cap and statute of
limitations. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B) (2001) (limiting medical malpractice
claims), with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12 (Supp. 2006) (abrogating those limitations for abortion
providers). See also Emily Townsend Black Grey, Comment, The Medical MalpracticeDamages Cap:
What Is Included?, 60 LA. L. REV. 547, 548-49 (2000) ("The legislature's purpose in enacting
[Louisiana's] Medical Malpractice Act. .. was to provide for affordable health care by preventing
tremendous liability and excessive insurance premiums."). But even if liability insurance became
available to cover risks imposed by unconstitutional, self-enforcing tort laws, those subject to the laws
would have to absorb the costs of these insurance premiums. The protection of constitutional rights
should not be surrendered to the vagaries of these potentially erratic market solutions.
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III. COURT DECISIONS
A. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: OKPALOBI V. FOSTER
Banning abortion has long been an official goal of the Louisiana
legislature, which has historically resisted the federal Constitution's
protection of that right. 38 From the nineteenth century until Roe v. Wade
39
was decided, Louisiana had banned abortions throughout pregnancy.
Louisiana reenacted an amended version of the same law in 1991, banning
abortion at all stages of pregnancy except when necessary to save the
pregnant woman's life or in limited cases of rape or incest.40 This law was
declared unconstitutional.4 1 Anticipating a day when abortion is no longer
protected under the Constitution, Louisiana has also passed a legislative
declaration that a fetus is a "legal person.., entitled to the right to life"
42
from the moment of conception.
In 1997, the legislature tried a new approach. It enacted a law entitled
"Liability for Termination of a Pregnancy" (the "Act").4 3 The Act provides:
Any person who performs an abortion is liable to the mother of the
unborn child for any damage occasioned or precipitated by the abortion,
38. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 442 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker, J., dissenting)
("'This appeal is the latest episode in a long effort by Louisiana to exercise its police power over a
practice to which the courts have given considerable protection."' (quoting Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794
F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1986))).
39. Louisiana crininalized abortions at least as early as 1870. See LA. REV. STAT. OF 1870 § 807.
This prohibition was amended in 1888 and included a mandatory sentence of one to ten years at hard
labor for abortion providers. See 1888 La. Acts. No. 24, § I (codified as LA. REV. STAT. OF 1870 § 807
(1897)). In 1942, Louisiana revised its criminal code, but retained the criminalization of abortion in the
new title. See 1942 La. Acts, No. 43, § 1, Art. 87 (codified as LA. REV. STAT. OF 1942 § 14:87 (1942)).
Minor revisions were subsequently enacted. See 1964 La. Acts, No. 167 (substituting "intent" for
"purpose" in the provision's first sentence).
40.
1991 La. Acts, No. 26, § 2 (codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (2004)). The law
imposed imprisonment "at hard labor for not less than one nor more than ten years" on a person who
performed a prohibited abortion. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87(E)(1) (2004).
41.
Sojourner T. v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930,932 (E.D. La. 1991), afT d sub nom. Sojourner T.
v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 31 (5th Cir. 1992).
42. H.R. Con. Res. No. 10, 1989 Second Extraordinary Sess. (La. 1989) (enacted in LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.0 (2001)). In addition to attempting to ban abortion outright, Louisiana has
passed numerous severe restrictions on abortion, many of which have been invalidated while others
remain on the books. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, WHO DECIDES? THE STATUS OF WOMEN'S
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (15th ed. 2006) (listing Louisiana's abortion
restrictions).
43.
1997 La. Acts, No. 825, § I (codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 9:2800.12 (Supp. 2006)). For
a discussion of the Act and the federal and state court decisions addressing it, see Jennifer L. Achilles,
Comment, Using Tort Law to Circumvent Roe v. Wade and Other Pesky Due Process Decisions:An
Examination of Louisiana'sAct 825, 78 TUL. L. REV. 853 (2004).
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which action survives for a period of three years from the date of
discovery of the damage
with a peremptive period of ten years from the
44
date of the abortion.
According to the Act, "'Damage' includes all special and general
damages which are recoverable in an intentional tort, negligence, survival,
or wrongful death action for injuries suffered or damages occasioned by the
unborn child or mother." 45 Moreover, the woman's consent to the abortion
is no defense, "but rather reduces the recovery of damages to the extent that
the content of the consent form informed the mother of the risk of the type
of injuries or loss for which she is seeking to recover." 4 6 Finally, laws
governing and limiting malpractice liability are expressly made
inapplicable to the Act.47
When abortion providers challenged the Act's constitutionality in
Okpalobi v. Foster, not one of the fifteen judges who heard the case at the
district or appellate level questioned the Act's intent to ban or severely
limit abortions.48 Essentially, the Act subjects an abortion provider to strict
liability for performing abortions. It appears to invite, for example, the
following scenario: A woman obtains a safe and legal abortion in
Louisiana. Nine years later, she has a religious conversion and now
believes that abortion is murder. She files a lawsuit claiming that, at the
time of the abortion, she did not know that she was "killing a child," but
that, since then, she has come to know that the fetus was indeed a child.
Moreover, while she signed a consent form acknowledging her awareness
of certain medical facts about the procedure and its consequences, she was
never offered and never signed a consent form informing her that the
abortion would entail the killing of a child. She therefore sues the abortion
provider for damages on her own behalf and that of the fetus. The doctor is
44. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12(A) (Supp. 2006).
45. Id. § 9:2800.12(B)(2) (emphasis added).
46. Id. § 9:2800.12(C)(1).
47. Id. § 9:2800.12(C)(2).
48. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 427 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting the statute's
coercive impact); id. at 429-32 (Higginbotham, J.) (not questioning the Act's coercive intent or effect);
id. at 435 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Act's mere existence
"coerces the plaintiffs to abandon the exercise of their legal rights"); id. at 442-43 (Parker, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Act was "not designed to help a woman's choice, but to eliminate that
choice by effectively shutting down abortion providers"); Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 356-57
(5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J.) (finding that "the State's proffered legislative purpose simply is not
credible" and that "there is significant evidence that the legislature intended the law" to have its actual
coercive effect); id. at 361 (Jolly, J., dissenting) (noting that the "statute [is] plainly aimed at making
medical practice more difficult for abortion doctors"); Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 983, 986
(E.D. La. 1998) (holding that the statute's unlimited, strict liability was designed to "chill[] the exercise
of constitutionally protected rights").
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subject to potentially catastrophic damages and is unprotected by
Louisiana's malpractice law.
Of course, in this scenario, the doctor continuing to provide abortions
in Louisiana could defend against the woman's lawsuit by claiming that it
is unconstitutional. It is equally plausible, however, that the Act would
deter Louisiana abortion providers from performing abortions altogether,
and that legal abortions would cease to be available in the state. Indeed,
several of the judges who heard Okpalobi concluded that the Act imposed,
or was substantially likely to impose, an undue burden on abortion rights
so,
by making it so risky to provide abortions that doctors would stop doing
49
leaving women without access to safe and legal abortions in Louisiana.
Typically, when unconstitutional abortion restrictions are proposed,
abortion providers bring pre-enforcement challenges to enjoin the
government from enforcing the laws. 50 In these circumstances, courts
customarily issue temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions
to protect providers while the lawsuit is pending. The providers thus need
not risk criminal or civil penalties in order to have the constitutional
question settled.5 1 When the Louisiana Act became effective, Louisiana
providers followed the now-familiar routine of filing a lawsuit for
declaratory and injunctive relief against the governor and the state attorney
general in federal court.
In the trial court, neither defendant raised Article HI standing
principles or the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a bar to the lawsuit.
Instead, they defended the law on its merits, arguing that the law imposed
appropriate standard-of-care and informed-consent requirements upon
abortion providers. 52 The district judge rejected these arguments and
granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs had
established a substantial likelihood of success in proving the law
unconstitutional. 53 The defendants appealed.
49. See, e.g., Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 360 (holding that Louisiana's strict liability regime "chills
the inclination of physicians to provide abortions and thus inflicts an undue burden" on women). See
also supra note 48.
50. It is virtually impossible for pregnant women who need abortions to be plaintiffs in a lawsuit
without eventually being mooted out. Moreover, privacy concerns often deter women from filing
challenges to abortion restrictions. The Supreme Court accordingly has long permitted abortion
providers to challenge abortion restrictions on behalf of their patients, whose constitutional rights the
laws infringe. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976).
51. This is precisely what the doctrine in Ex parte Young was meant to ensure. See Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 145-49 (1908); infra notes 214-218 and accompanying text (discussing Ex parte
Young).
52. Okpalobi, 981 F. Supp. at 982.
53. Id. at 987-88.
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A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. Before reaching the merits, however, the majority
addressed sua sponte the issues of Article HI standing and Eleventh
Amendment immunity.54 The court concluded that neither doctrine posed a
bar to the plaintiffs' lawsuit.
Considering the Eleventh Amendment question, the Fifth Circuit panel
first discussed the doctrine of Ex parte Young, pursuant to which state
officers may be sued to enjoin the enforcement of unconstitutional acts.5 5
In particular, the court focused on the requirement that plaintiffs establish a
"connection" between the state official sued and enforcement of the act.
The court found no authority to establish that "'the general duty of a
governor to enforce state laws ... [is] sufficient to make him a proper party
defendant in a civil rights action attacking the constitutionality of a state
56
statute concerning ... private civil actions."'

Instead, relying on a 1979 decision from the Southern District of Ohio,
the court applied a two-part test for determining whether a sufficient
connection exists between the state official and statutory enforcement.
First, the court looked at the defendants' power to enforce the law in
question. Second, the court examined "the nature of the law and its place
on the continuum between public regulation and private action." 57 The
court found that the governor and attorney general had general powers and
duties of enforcement under Louisiana law, if not expressly under the
statute at issue, sufficient to meet the first prong of the test. 58 Moreover, the
court concluded that the Louisiana law was "a thinly-veiled attempt to
regulate and interfere with a right protected by the United States
[C]onstitution." 5 9 The court thus found that the law, although creating a
private cause of action, was "'designed to implement and serve the public
interest of the state.' "60
The Fifth Circuit panel next considered whether there was a justiciable
case or controversy between the plaintiffs and the defendants pursuant to
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The court found that "the claim
for declaratory relief can stand on its own for purposes of the case or
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
aft'd, 679

Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 343-49.
Id. at 343-47.
Id. at 345 (quoting Gras v. Stevens, 415 F. Supp. 1148, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. at 347.
Id. (quoting Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 569 (S.D. Ohio 1979),
F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982)).
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controversy jurisdictional requirement." 6' The court admitted that it was
"[l]ess obvious" whether the named defendants were the "proper
defendants in plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief," but concluded that the
private enforcement mechanism in the statute did not make the suit against
the state defendants improper. 62 The court also found that the existence of
an actual controversy did not hinge on the defendant state officers
enforcing or threatening to enforce the law. It maintained that the
coercively self-enforcing nature of the statute rendered it unnecessary for
plaintiffs to plead or prove such threats of enforcement.6 3
The appellate panel then affirmed the district court's order
permanently enjoining the "'operation and effect"' of the statute. 64 The
court found that the statute was impermissible both in its purpose (to deter
the provision of abortions in Louisiana) and in its likely effect
(significantly reducing the number of abortion providers in the state).65 The
statute was thus unconstitutional under Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which prohibits laws that have the
purpose or effect of placing "a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion." 6 6 The court also found the statute unconstitutionally
vague.

67

The defendants sought and were granted a rehearing en banc. 68 The en
banc court reversed the panel's decision. 69 Judge Jolly, who had dissented
below, wrote the majority opinion, in which the court held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing under Article llI.70 While he acknowledged that
the court's consideration of the merits of plaintiffs' claims "may have
strong appeal to some," Judge Jolly concluded that "we are powerless to act
except to say that we cannot act: these plaintiffs have no case or
71
controversy with these defendants."
Before addressing the Article 1mI question, however, Judge Jolly
contended that the state officials were immune from suit under the Eleventh
61.
62.
63.
64.
converted
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.at 348.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 361. The district court had originally issued a preliminary injunction, which was later
to a permanent injunction upon the parties' agreement. See id. at 341.
Id. at 357.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 359.
Okpalobi v. Foster, 201 F.3d 353, 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405,409 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
See id. at 409.
Id.
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73
Amendment.7 2 Only half of the court joined this section of the opinion.
Nevertheless, Judge Jolly devoted more than twelve pages of his opinion to
making his case. 74 He acknowledged that, under the doctrine articulated by
the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, state officials can be sued "for the
purpose of enjoining the enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute. 7 5
But Judge Jolly read the Ex parte Young doctrine as requiring that officials
be closely connected to the enforcement of the challenged law before they
may be sued.76 He asserted that the Ex parte Young doctrine hinges on both
a "particular duty to enforce the statute in question and a demonstrated
willingness to exercise that duty." 77 Because the Act provided only for
private lawsuits and gave no enforcement role to the state, Judge Jolly
concluded that the governor and attorney general lacked the necessary
78
connection to enforcement of the Act.

Judge Jolly also found "seriously erroneous" the panel's two-part test,
in which it situated the law on a continuum between public regulation and
private action. 79 As to the first prong, Judge Jolly rejected the notion that
the requisite enforcement connection could be established by an
"undefined, inchoate, general duty to see that all of the laws of the state are
enforced. ' 80 He rejected the second prong entirely, questioning courts'
ability to determine where different laws belong on a spectrum of public81
to-private regulation.
Judge Jolly, now writing for the majority, then turned to the question
of Article III standing, summarizing the three criteria necessary to establish
a case or controversy under Article III: (1) injury in fact, (2) a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3)
redressibility. 82 The court did not dispute that the plaintiffs had suffered an
injury, implying that injury in fact could result from a coercively self72.
d. at 424.
73. Id. at 408. In concurrence, Judge Higginbotham argued that the Article I1 question was
dispositive and that the court should not have reached the Eleventh Amendment issue at all. See id. at
429-30 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
74. See id. at 411-24.
75. Id. at 411.
76. Id. at 415 ("Young requires both a close connection between the official and the act and the
threatening or commencement of enforcement proceedings by the official."). Elsewhere, he described
Young as requiring simply "some connection" between defendant state officials and enforcement of the
act. See id. at 416.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 416-17,423.
79. Id. at417.
80. Id. at 418.
81. See id. at 421.
82. See id. at 425.
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enforcing statute.83 The court found, however, that the plaintiffs had not
proven causation or redressability: "[T]he panel confuses the statute's
immediate coercive effect on the plaintiffs with any coercive effect that
might be applied by the defendants-that is, the Governor and the Attorney
General. 84 Moreover, Judge Jolly reasoned that an injunction against the
defendants would be "utterly meaningless" because they had neither the
power to enforce the statute nor the power to prevent a private plaintiff
85
from filing suit under the law.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' concern that, by refusing to
consider the merits of the case, the court would allow an unconstitutional
statute to remain law.86 The court rejoined that "anyone exposed to actual
liability under this statute has immediate redress-that is to say, a
defendant sued by a private plaintiff under Act 825 can immediately and
87
forthwith challenge the constitutionality of the statute."
B. THE TENTH

CIRCUIT: NOVA HEALTH SYSTEMS V. GANDY

Soon after the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Oklahoma legislature
enacted a strikingly similar law. 88 Rather than threatening the provision of
all abortions, however, Oklahoma's enactment effectively imposed an
unconstitutional parental consent requirement on teenagers seeking
abortions. 89 The statute imposed upon "[a]ny person who performs an
abortion on a minor without parental consent or knowledge" civil liability
"for the cost of any subsequent medical treatment such minor might require
because of the abortion." 90 Like the Louisiana statute, the law imposed
strict liability and assigned the state no direct enforcement role.9 ' Instead,
the threat of private lawsuits forced providers to choose between refusing
to provide abortions to minors without parental consent or risking
potentially major civil liability regardless of fault or malpractice. Also like
the Louisiana statute, Oklahoma's initial version of the law would
83. See id. at 426.
84. Id. at 426-27.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 429 n.40.
87. Id. The statute was later challenged in state court, but this lawsuit was also dismissed for lack
of a justiciable controversy. See supra note 12.
88. 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws, c. 379, § 2 (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740 (West
2004)).
89. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740 (West 2004) (requiring parental consent for minors as
a prerequisite to receiving an abortion, but without allowing for any form of judicial bypass, as required
by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992)).
90. Id.
91. See id.
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undoubtedly have been struck as unconstitutional had the appellate court
reached the merits of the case: parental notification or consent laws for
abortion must include exceptions for teenagers whose health is at risk and
must provide some judicial mechanism for teenagers to bypass the parental
involvement requirement.9 2
The statute was challenged by Nova Health Systems, which operates a
93
medical clinic offering reproductive health services, including abortions.
Because the statute did not limit lawsuits to parents or other private
individuals, Nova named as defendants government officials who oversaw
health facilities that might provide postabortion medical care to teenagers
and who might sue Nova to recover the costs of such care. 94 The
defendants countered that they were entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.9 5 They argued that, as in Okpalobi, the state could not be sued
because it lacked any enforcement role. 96 Moreover, the defendants argued
that they had not enforced or threatened to enforce the law. They asserted
that any claim that they might enforce the law by seeking to recover
medical costs from Nova Health Systems was speculative and therefore not
97
ripe for review.
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
addressed justiciability issues in two separate rulings at various procedural
points in the case. 98 In each opinion, the court held that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar Nova's claims against several defendants. 99 The
court held that an imminent threat of enforcement was not required, finding
that the statute's chilling effect would otherwise "virtually immunize the
92. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 126 S.Ct. 961, 966-67 (2006); Casey,
505 U.S. at 899 (1992). The "judicial bypass" mechanism that has become standard in such legislation
allows a teenager to be granted access to an abortion without her parents' involvement if she proves to a
judge that she is either mature enough to choose the abortion on her own or that an abortion would be in
her best interests. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44, 651 (1979). Oklahoma revised its
statute in 2005 to include a judicial bypass option and a medical emergency exception. See OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-740.1 to -740.3 (West Supp. 2006). Oklahoma also made conducting such
abortions a misdemeanor. Id. § 1-740.4 (Supp. 2006).
93. See Nova Health Sys. v. Fogarty, No. 01-CV-0419-EA, 2002 WL 32595281, at *1 (N.D.
Okla. June 14, 2002). Nova sued on behalf of itself and its minor abortion patients.
94. See Nova Health Sys., 2002 WL 32595281, at * 1-2.
95. Id.
96. See id. at *3.
97. See id.
at *2-3.
98. See id. at *1-5, *14; Nova Health Sys. v. Fogarty, No. 01-CV-419-K(E), slip op. at 5-6
(N.D. Okla. Oct. 15, 2001).
99. See Nova Health Sys., No. 01-CV-419-K(E), slip op. at 5-11; Nova Health Sys., 2002 WL
32595281, at *2 (rejecting the defendants' renewed assertions that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
plaintiffs' claims).
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statute.., from pre-enforcement challenge."' 00 In its first ruling, the court
found that several state defendants did have authority to "enforce the
challenged statute if they provided the requisite 'subsequent medical
01
treatment' and allowed the lawsuit to proceed against those defendants.'
In its second ruling, the court concluded that the statute's chilling effect
resolved the ripeness question. The court declared, "[I]f this case is not ripe
now, it never will be," as Nova had already begun to refuse abortions to
10 2
minors who lacked "written, in-person consent from a parent."'
The court also found that the plaintiffs met Article I1 standing
requirements. 10 3 First, the court held that the statute imposed a risk of
financial loss upon Nova, thereby satisfying the "injury-in-fact"
requirement. 10 4 Second, the court held that this injury was "'fairly
traceable"' to the defendants' ability to sue Nova for recovery of medical
costs. 10 5 Third, the court held that redressability was met because
declaratory relief would redress Nova's injury by deterring potential
litigants and helping Nova defend itself against suits, while injunctive relief
would prevent the named defendants from suing.' 0 6 Turning to the merits,
the district court held the statute unconstitutional, finding that it imposed an
undue burden on minors seeking an abortion because it would force Nova
to require parental consent without providing for either a judicial bypass
option or an exception for the health of the minor.107 The court also
0 8
concluded that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.'
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the grounds
that there was no genuine case or controversy between the parties. 10 9 The
court agreed that Nova sufficiently demonstrated "that it faced a concrete
and imminent injury in fact," namely the loss of potential abortion patients
under Nova's new policy requiring in-person parental consent for
minors. 110 However, the court found that Nova had failed to establish a
causal connection between this injury and the named defendants." 1 The
100.

Nova Health Sys., No. 01-CV-419-K(E), slip op. at 5-6.

101.

Id. at 8.

102. See Nova Health Sys., 2002 WL 32595281, at *3.
103. Id. at*5.
104. Id. at *4.
105. Id. at *5 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
261 (1977)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at *13. Oklahoma later revised its statute to address these infirmities. See supra note 92.
108. Id. at *"12-13.
109.
110.
111.

Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1156.
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court acknowledged that the enactment of the tort statute had "coerced
[Nova] into requiring at least some sort of parental involvement prior to
performing an abortion on a minor."' 112 But the court distinguished the
statute's coercive effect from any action that the defendants might take,
finding the latter to be purely speculative.1 1 3 "A party may not attack a tort
statute in federal court simply by naming as a defendant anyone who might
1 14
someday have a cause of action under the challenged law."'
For similar reasons, the court found that an injunction against the
named defendants would not redress the plaintiff's injury, because "there
would still be a multitude of other prospective litigants who could
potentially sue Nova under that act."' 15 The court also rejected as overly
speculative the notion that a declaratory judgment would redress Nova's
injury by deterring potential litigants. 1 6 Moreover, the court stated that
redressability must be measured by the effect of the court's judgment on a
defendant, not on those who are not parties to the action. 1 7 Finally, the
Tenth Circuit panel noted the lack of "'concrete adverseness"' 1 18 between
the parties and concluded that the named defendants-hospital directors
and university administrators-did not have a particularly strong incentive
' 119
"to defend a politically divisive abortion statute."
C. A CRITIQUE OF THE FIFTH AND TENTH CIRCUITS' REASONING IN
OKPALOBI AND NOVA

1. Article HI Case or Controversy
The Fifth Circuit justifiably rejected the plaintiffs' claims for
injunctive relief against the governor and attorney general in Okpalobi on
the grounds that an injunction against these defendants would not redress
the plaintiffs' injuries.120 Private citizens, not the state of Louisiana, are the
ones empowered to sue under the statute. An injunction against the named
state officials would effectively be meaningless-the officials had no
enforcement power to enjoin and an injunction would not bar private
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
(1978)).
119.
120.

Id.
Id.at1157.
Id.at1153.
Id. at1158-59.
Id.at1159-60.
Id.at1159.
Id. at 1160 (quoting Duke Power Co. v.Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 72
Id.
See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 427 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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suits. 121 Judge Benavides, who dissented in part in Okpalobi, agreed. 122 As
Judge Benavides concluded, however, the Fifth Circuit should have granted
the plaintiffs standing on their claim for declaratory judgment-the
Okpalobi plaintiffs did satisfy the constitutional standing requirements
for a
123
declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional.
The Declaratory Judgment Act permits a federal court, in a "case of
actual controversy," to "declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration."1 24 The Act "manifestly has
regard to... [Article 111] and is operative only in respect to controversies
which are such in the constitutional sense."1 25 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has employed somewhat different language in describing standing
requirements under the Act from the three-part test used to determine
standing generally under Article III. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Haworth, the Court explained that a "justiciable controversy" under the
Declaratory Judgment Act must be "a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts." 126 In a later decision, the Court stated that, to
determine whether plaintiffs have standing under the Act, a court must
consider "whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
127
declaratory judgment."
Where plaintiffs, in response to an unconstitutional, strict liability
scheme, stop engaging in conduct rather than risk catastrophic damages,
121. Arguably, the court could have enjoined the attorney general from intervening in any private
lawsuit to defend the constitutionality of the statute. But had the court granted declaratory relief, res
judicata would bar the attorney general from intervening in private lawsuits brought under the statute,
rendering any such injunction superfluous.
122. See Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 433, 436 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 433-36.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000). A declaratory judgment is an independent source of relief;
plaintiffs need not pair their request for such a judgment with a claim for an injunction. See Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1974).
125. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937).
126. Id. at 240-41.
127. See Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) (emphasis added). This
implies a distinct Article III standing test under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Some courts, however,
have considered traditional Article III standing to be a predicate for standing under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. See, e.g., Lawson v. Callahan, 111 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
Declaratory Judgment Act does not independently convey federal subject matter jurisdiction and that
the "actual controversy" requirement under the Act is "identical to the meaning of 'case or controversy'
for the purposes of Article IF').
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the controversy could scarcely be more immediate and real. Unlike a case
in which injury is speculative and contingent upon unforeseeable events, a
plaintiff's injury in such a case has already occurred and will continue until
the statute is declared unconstitutional. Even the majority in Okpalobi
128
acknowledged "the statute's immediate coercive effect on the plaintiffs."
Moreover, adverseness between the parties is clearly present when a
state must defend the constitutionality of a self-enforcing law that
implements controversial social policy, even where the state retains no
formal enforcement role.1 29 In both Okpalobi and Nova, such an
adverseness was evident. The court in Nova noted that the named
defendants (state-owned health care providers) had no particular incentive
to defend the controversial statute's constitutionality. 3 0 Yet the
policymakers who enacted the statute were clearly motivated to do so,
filing an amicus brief urging the court to uphold the statute. 131 Likewise, in
Okpalobi, both the governor and attorney general initially mounted a
vigorous defense of the statute's merits until the Fifth Circuit panel sua
sponte addressed the issues of Article III standing and sovereign
immunity. 132 Although the states' eagerness to defend the statute's merits
may not itself generate standing, it "creates the odor of a 'case or
controversy'-precisely what [the state] claims is absent."' 3 3 Thus,
plaintiffs seeking declaratory judgments that invalidate statutes like those
challenged in Okpalobi and Nova readily meet the standing test employed
pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Indeed, such plaintiffs even meet the traditional test for standing under
Article III. Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to deciding
"cases" or "controversies." 134 In order to establish a case or controversy,
plaintiffs must meet three requirements: they must allege (1) a personal
injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful
135
conduct and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.
128.
129.
unlimited
130.
131.
132.

See Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 426 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 443 (Parker, J., dissenting) (considering that "privatizing the enforcement of
monetary damages.., is undoubtedly a state-sanctioned penalty").
See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2005).
See id. at 1149.
See Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 410 n.5; Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 982-83 (E.D. La.

1998).
133.
134.

See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 940 F.2d 73, 77 (4th Cir. 1991).
U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2.
.

135.

E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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a. Injury-in-Fact Requirement
Plaintiffs meet the injury-in-fact requirement when a statute forces
them to change their conduct in order to avoid liability or prosecution. For
example, in Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, the Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of a statute that restricted the commercial
display of certain "visual or written material that 'depicts sexually explicit
nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which is harmful to
juveniles."' 13 6 The Court noted, "[T]he alleged danger of this statute is, in
large measure, one of self-censorship; a harm that can be realized even
without an actual prosecution."' 137 Statutes like those enacted by Louisiana
and Oklahoma use the fear of tort liability to compel individuals or entities
to stop engaging in conduct they believe is constitutionally protected.
In both Okpalobi and Nova, the defendants asserted that there was no
injury in fact because neither they nor anyone else had actually threatened
to enforce the statute. Although the doctrine of ripeness requires that the
"injury in fact be certainly impending,"' 38 courts have not always required
an actual threat of enforcement to establish ripeness, particularly when an
allegedly unconstitutional statute chills conduct. 139 Rather, courts have
traditionally found the injury element met if plaintiffs would otherwise be
"put to the Hobson's choice of giving up an intended course of conduct
which... [they believe they are] entitled to undertake or facing possible
severe civil or criminal consequences."' 140 Courts have even entertained
136. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 386 (1988) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-391(a) (Supp. 1987)).
137. Id. at 393. See also Mobil Oil Corp., 940 F.2d at 76 (finding that a plaintiff meets the injuryin-fact requirement for standing when that plaintiff self-censors by complying with the statute in order
to avoid enforcement).
138. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
139. See Am. Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 393 ("We are not troubled by the pre-enforcement nature of
this suit.... [P]laintiffs have alleged an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced
against them." (emphasis added)).
140. See Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491,507 n.22 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
See also Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that the
plaintiffs, who abandoned a line of business in response to passage of gun control legislation, "have
alleged an immediate, concrete injury-in-fact"). In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court seemed to
view skeptically the propriety of federal courts issuing pre-enforcement injunctions based on a statute's
facial unconstitutionality. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42, 50 (1971) (holding that merely feeling
"inhibited" from engaging in constitutionally protected speech was insufficient for a plaintiff to
establish jurisdiction for a federal court to enjoin the prosecution of another under a state statute). But in
later cases, the Court has made clear that Younger is "expressly limited to situations where state
prosecutions were pending when the federal action commenced." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
457 (1974). Thus, in Younger, the constitutionality of the statute would theoretically be addressed by
the defendant in the pending state action, making other actions potentially moot. This is not the case
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lawsuits where the state's attorney general not only failed to threaten
enforcement, but also declined to defend a statute, agreeing that it was
unconstitutional. 14 1 Plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of selfenforcing tort statutes thus easily satisfy the injury requirement under
Article III. Indeed, neither the Fifth nor the Tenth Circuit questioned the
existence of an injury in fact in Okpalobi and Nova.
b. Causation Requirement
The requirement of causation raises a harder question. Both the Fifth
and Tenth Circuits concluded that the plaintiffs' injuries in each case were
not caused by the named state officials. 142 In Okpalobi, the state lacked any
specific enforcement role whatsoever. 143 In Nova, the named state officials
were just a few of the many parties who arguably could have sued to
recover the costs of medical treatment; there was no official role for the
state in the Oklahoma statute.1 44
In refusing to find causation in each case, the courts in Okpalobi and
Nova focused on whether the individual defendants had themselves caused
the plaintiffs' injuries.145 But this is the wrong approach to causation in
these cases. The injury to plaintiffs in self-executing statutory liability
schemes has by definition occurred before any individual state official's
involvement in enforcing the law. As both courts recognized, the injury lies
146
in an unconstitutional statute coercing the cessation of protected conduct.
with self-executing, private enforcement schemes. If the statute chills the targeted conduct, no state
action will ever commence, foreclosing even this avenue for asserting the constitutional arguments.
141. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2000).
When the attorney general, the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners, and the commissioner of the
state's Department of Health and Senior Services all declined to defend New Jersey's "partial-birth
abortion" ban, the state legislature appointed private counsel to intervene. See id.
142. See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2005); Okpalobi v. Foster,
244 F.3d 405, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). In Nova, the Tenth Circuit declared that a "but for"
causal connection between plaintiff's injury and defendant is required. Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 388
F.3d 744, 750-51 (10th Cit. 2004). This conclusion is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedents on
Article 111standing, however. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 75 n.20, 77 (1978) (stating that iron-clad proof of "but for" causation is not required to establish
causation or redressability). As the dissent in Nova pointed out, the standard is not "but for" causation,
but whether injury is "fairly traceable" to defendants' conduct, a lower standard. Nova Health Sys., 388
F.3d at 756 & n.1 (Briscoe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000) (requiring only that an injury be "fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant"); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801
(1992) (same); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (same).
143. See Okpalobi,244 F.3d at 426-27.
144. See Nova Health Sys. v. Fogarty, No. 01-CV-0419-EA, 2002 WL 32595281, at *1-2 (N.D.
Okla. June 14, 2002).
145. See Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1156; Okpalobi,244 F.3d at 426-27.
146. See Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1155; Okpalobi,244 F.3d at 426.
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The plaintiffs in Okpalobi did not sue the state officials because of
anything they did as individuals. 147 Rather, they sued them as
representatives of the state itself. 148 The state, not any private individual or
even any individual state official, caused their injuries by enacting a statute
designed to produce this kind of chilling effect. 149 The majority in
Okpalobi missed the mark when it claimed that "it is the private plaintiff,
bringing a private lawsuit under Act 825, who causes the injury of which
50
the plaintiffs complain."'
Dissenting judges in both Okpalobi and Nova recognized this. In
Okpalobi, Judge Benavides pointed out that plaintiffs' injury-giving up an
intended course of conduct rather than risking substantial civil liabilitywas "directly traceable to the promulgation of [the] Act."' 5 ' Likewise,
Judge Briscoe, dissenting in Nova, recognized that state officials are sued
in such cases not because the particular official "is himself a source of
injury, but because the official represents the state whose statute is being
challenged as the source of injury." 152 Other courts, addressing stateenforced prohibitions, have likewise recognized that Article III injury can
153
be caused by the very enactment of coercively self-enforcing statutes.
Of course, the specific state bodies that caused the injury in Okpalobi
and Nova are the state legislatures and governors that enacted the self147. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing why the plaintiffs sued the
particular named defendants in Okpalobi). The Ex parte Young fiction posits that government officials
sued in challenges to unconstitutional laws are "stripped of [their] official or representative character,"
thus permitting them to be sued despite a state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908). But federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have
acknowledged the limits of this fiction. See infra notes 227-232 and accompanying text (discussing
same).
148. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 977-78 (E.D. La. 1998). Cf Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Attorney Gen., 940 F.2d 73, 76 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that "[t]he Attorney General tries to distance
herself from the state, but we think a dispute with a state suffices to create a dispute with the state's
enforcement officer sued in a representative capacity," and that "'a controversy exists not because the
state official is himself a source of injury but because the official represents the state whose statute is
being challenged as the source of injury."' (quoting Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 947 (10th Cir.
1987))).
149. See Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 443 (Parker, J., dissenting) ("By privatizing the enforcement of
unlimited monetary damages, which is undoubtedly a state-sanctioned penalty, the State is... effecting
a coercive impact so drastic that abortion providers have no choice but to cease operations.").
150. See id. at 428 (en banc) (emphasis omitted).
151.
Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 435 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added). See also Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1162 (Briscoe, J.,
concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that "the statute's mere existence presents an 'appreciable threat of injury'
by causing plaintiffs to cease providing abortions to minors without in-person parental consent).
152. See Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1161-62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. See, e.g., Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997).
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executing liability scheme. In addition, the state courts stand in as a kind of
shadow enforcer, because they are implicitly charged with hearing the
private lawsuits authorized by the statute. Absent state court adjudication of
these claims, the private lawsuits would carry no threat.1 54 The legislators
and judges are immune from suit. 15 5 The governors, however, were also
instrumental because they signed the bills into law, ensuring that the
policies would take effect. 156 The chill of the plaintiffs' constitutionally
to the governor's
protected conduct in each case is thus "directly traceable"
57
actions, making the governor an appropriate defendant. 1
Moreover, once the statute becomes law, it becomes the responsibility
particular the attorney general, the state's
of the executive branch-in
"chief legal officer"' 5 8-to enforce and defend it. 159 Indeed, attorneys
general can, and often do, intervene in private lawsuits in order to defend
the constitutionality of statutes.' 60 It is entirely appropriate for them to be
called upon to defend statutes like these, which enact social policy on
154. Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (finding state action where "states have made
available to such [private] individuals the full coercive power of government" through judicial
enforcement of private, racially restrictive covenants).
155. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-78 (1951) (detailing the scope of
legislative immunity); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347-49 (1871) (discussing judicial immunity).
156. Had the governor vetoed the legislation, it could have taken effect only upon the legislature's
override. In this case, the plaintiffs' injury would not be traceable to the governor, but, as I argue below,
plaintiffs should still be allowed to sue the attorney general. Moreover, a similar causal line could be
drawn to other officials who played a role in making the statute effective. See, e.g., Allied Artists
Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 563 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (hearing a case where the plaintiffs
sued, inter alia, the secretary of state, who accepted the act for filing and thus caused it to become part
of the Revised Code of Ohio). But see id. at 569-70 (finding that the secretary of state lacked a
sufficient connection to the enforcement of the act and was thus protected by the principles of sovereign
immunity).
157.
A governor's signing of an unconstitutional statute into law is a sufficient causal connection
to support jurisdiction even under the Tenth Circuit's more stringent-and probably erroneousrequirement of "but for" causation. Compare Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 388 F.3d 744, 750-51 (10th
Cir. 2004) (suggesting a "but for" causation requirement for standing), with id. at 756 & n.I (Briscoe,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disputing the majority's requirement of "but for" causation
as unsupported by precedent). See also supra note 142.
158. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8. In some states, the governor is constitutionally or
statutorily entrusted with the general power to enforce the state's laws or to see that the laws are
faithfully executed. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 473 F. Supp. at 566-67.
159. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:257 (2003) ("Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary,
the attorney general, at his discretion, shall represent or supervise the representation of the interests of
the state in any action or proceeding in which the constitutionality of a state statute ... of the legislature
is challenged or assailed."). See also id. § 13:4448 (1991) ("Prior to adjudicating the constitutionality of
a statute of the state of Louisiana, the courts of appeal and the Supreme Court of Louisiana shall notify
the attorney general of the proceeding and afford him an opportunity to be heard.").
160. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8 ("As necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or
interest of the state, the attorney general shall have authority ... to institute, prosecute, or intervene in
").
any civil action or proceeding ....

2006]

LEGISLATIVE ARROGANCE

behalf of the state in a constitutionally suspect way. 16 1 In Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Attorney General, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the state attorney
general's right to intervene when it held that a challenge to provisions of
the Virginia Petroleum Products Franchise Act presented an Article III case
or controversy between the attorney general and the plaintiffs. 162 The
attorney general had argued that her enforcement power under the statute
was discretionary and that the statute was "intended to be enforced by
private suits." 1 63 The Fourth Circuit deemed this "irrelevant," noting that

the attorney general could, in any such private suit, intervene to defend the
statute's constitutionality.' 64 The court concluded, "[This] case is precisely
the one for which the Declaratory Judgments [sic] Act was designed.
Public policy should encourage a person aggrieved by laws he considers
unconstitutional to seek a declaratory judgment against the arm of the state
165
entrusted with the state's enforcement power."
Requiring the injury to be traceable to an individual or entity who
might file a private suit under the statute is equivalent to denying a
constitutional challenge altogether. The Tenth Circuit in Nova considered
any threat posed by the named defendants too speculative, noting that
"nothing in the record distinguishes these defendants from any other party
who might one day have the occasion to seek compensatory damages under
the challenged statute as a civil plaintiff."' 166 Of course, this could be said
of any given potential claimant. Because the ability to sue for damages
under the statute depends upon unpredictable events, abortion providers
cannot know in advance who will sue them. 167 If they are unable to obtain
prospective relief, their safest course is to comply with the statute. Those
targeted by self-executing, private liability schemes would thus take cold
comfort from the Okpalobi majority's assurance that "anyone exposed to
actual liability under ... [such a] statute has immediate redress-that is to
say, a defendant sued by a private plaintiff.., can immediately and
161. Whether a sued state official must have some specific "connection" to the challenged statute
in order to overcome claims of sovereign immunity is a different question, addressed by the Ex parte
Young analysis. See infra Part HI.C.2 (discussing Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity analysis).
162. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 940 F.2d 73, 75-77 (4th Cir. 1991).
163. Id. at 76.
164. Id. at 76-77.
165. Id. at75.
166. See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005).
167. Under the Oklahoma statute, for example, a cause of action for damages would only arise
upon a minor patient's need for medical treatment after an abortion. As such, future abortion patients
would have neither an immediate cause of action against providers nor an anticipation of some cause of
action. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740 (West 2004).
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forthwith challenge the constitutionality of the statute." 168 If they cease to
engage in the targeted conduct-a result the statutes seem designed to
produce-these individuals will never obtain redress, immediate or
otherwise.
c. Redressability Requirement
Redressability, the third element required for Article III standing, was
also a sticking point for the courts in Okpalobi and Nova. 169 The Supreme
Court has stated that "when a plaintiffs standing is brought into issue the
relevant inquiry is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the
plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressedby a
favorable decision." 170 Redressability does not imply absolute certainty
that the requested relief will redress the injury. As the Supreme Court has
noted, "Our recent cases have required no more than a showing that there is
a 'substantial likelihood' that the relief requested will redress the injury
claimed....",'
A declaratory judgment against the governor or attorney general
would have redressed the plaintiffs' injuries by providing them sufficient
assurance to continue providing abortions. As certain as one might be that a
statute is unconstitutional, when faced with potentially grave financial
consequences, risk-averse individuals will be deterred by even a small
chance that a court might disagree. A lower federal court's declaration of
unconstitutionality would not technically be binding upon state courts. But
in confirming a plaintiffs assessment of the statute's infirmity, the
declaration would give plaintiffs the comfort needed to resume providing
abortions. 172
A declaratory judgment, although not officially binding on private
parties, would also likely deter private lawsuits. The Supreme Court has
found redressability when actors who were not parties to a lawsuit could be
expected to amend their conduct in response to a court's declaration. For
example, in Franklin v. Massachusetts, plaintiffs sued the Secretary of
Commerce and the President in challenging the allocation of the
Department of Defense's overseas employees to particular states for
168. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405,429 n.40 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
169. See Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1158-60; Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 426-27.
170. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (emphasis added).
171.
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978).
172. See, e.g., Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 436 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The requested declaration sufficiently redresses [the] injury by granting the plaintiffs a substantial
basis for confidence in the constitutionality of their conduct.").
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reapportionment purposes in the 1990 census. 17 3 Justice O'Connor
questioned the propriety of an injunction against the President, but she
concluded that redressability was met in any event because "the injury
alleged [was] likely to be redressed by declaratory relief against the
'
Secretary alone."174
She further explained, "[W]e may assume it is
substantially likely that the President and other executive and congressional
officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of the census statute
and constitutional provision by the District Court, even though they would
not be directly bound by such a determination." 175
Even if a private lawsuit were brought, a declaratory judgment would
help secure a quick victory for the defendants because a court would likely
find the prior determination of unconstitutionality persuasive. Moreover, in
response to the declaration of unconstitutionality, the legislature might
repeal or amend the statute. 176 In the absence of such legislative action, the
attorney general might issue an opinion advising that private lawsuits
brought under the act would fail due to the statute's unconstitutionality,
173. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 790-91 (1992).
174. Id. at 803 (O'Connor, J.).
175. Id. Justice O'Connor's views in Franklin contradict the Tenth Circuit's assertion that
redressability must be determined solely by a judgment's effect on the named defendants. See Nova
Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1158-60 (10th Cir. 2005) (defining redressability solely in terms
of any effect on the defendants in the case). While only three Justices joined the portion of Justice
O'Connor's opinion that found redressability, a majority of Justices implicitly agreed that the
requirements for standing were met. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 824 n.l (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Although only a plurality of the Court joins that portion of Justice O'Connor's
opinion which finds standing (Part i1), I must conclude that the Court finds standing since eight
Justices join Part IV of the Court's opinion discussing the merits of appellees' constitutional claims.").
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Scalia asserted that redressability was lacking where the
named defendant, the Secretary of the Interior, lacked binding authority over the funding agencies
whose decisions to fund particular projects caused the alleged harm. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568-69 (1992) (Scalia, J.). But this part of Scalia's opinion was not joined by a
majority of the Court; other justices expressly refused to reach the issue of redressability. See, e.g., id. at
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the plaintiff's failure
to show an injury was dispositive and therefore the issue of redressability need not be addressed).
Moreover, once the element of causation has been established, the Court has seemed less
concerned about connecting the element of redressability to the named defendants. Instead, the Court
has focused on the ability of the courts to redress the claimed injury. See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S.
452, 459 (2002) ("A lawsuit does not fall within this grant of judicial authority unless, among other
things, courts have the power to 'redress' the 'injury' that the defendant allegedly 'caused' the
plaintiff.").
176. See, e.g., Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 440 n.13 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting the persuasive effect that a declaratory judgment might have on a state legislature).
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further deterring private
suits and giving plaintiffs comfort to resume the
77
targeted conduct. 1
The redressability requirement is satisfied by these likely effects of a
declaratory judgment, even though the effects cannot be assured. As the
Court recently suggested in Utah v. Evans, as long as the controversy
before a court is concrete and adversarial, redressability "as a practical
matter" must only be likely, not certain. 178 Moreover, the court's order
need not directly cause the action that ultimately redresses a plaintiff's
injury. The Court in Evans found standing met where "the courts would
have ordered a change in a legal status... and the practical consequence
of that change would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that
the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury
79
suffered."1
The declaratory judgment remedy is precisely suited to redress injury
caused by regulation that "imposes costly, self-executing compliance
burdens." 180 Judge Benavides, dissenting in Okpalobi, noted that
Louisiana's statute presented "what this Court has recognized as the classic
situation for declaratory relief." 18 1 Indeed, the legislative history of the
federal Declaratory Judgment Act recognized that declaratory judgments
have "been especially useful in avoiding the necessity ...of having to act
at one's peril. .. or abandon one's rights because of a fear of incurring
18 2
damages."
d. Rationale Underlying the Article III Standing Requirements
In considering whether the discrete elements of the Article III standing
test are met by plaintiffs challenging unconstitutional, self-enforcing
private liability schemes, it is important not to lose sight of the underlying
purpose of that test. The requirements of injury in fact, causation, and
177. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:251 (2003) (providing that, upon request of the governor
or "any political subdivision," the attorney general shall give written opinions on "all questions of
law").
178. See Evans, 536 U.S. at 460 (noting that, in Franklin, 505 U.S. at 803 (O'Connor, J.), four
justices found no further obstacle to standing if redress merely seemed likely).
179. Id. at 464 (emphasis added). See also id. at 461 (noting that the plaintiffs in Franklin and in
Evans "reasonably believed that the Secretary's recertification, as a practical matter, would likely lead
to a new, more favorable, apportionment of Representatives").
180. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. FEC, 113 F.3d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1997)
(considering that such hardship meets the requirements for a declaratory judgment remedy against an
unconstitutional federal administrative regulation).
181. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 435 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 507 n.22 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (stating same);
Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating same)).
182. See S. REP. No. 73-1005, at 2-3, 6 (1934).
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redressability are meant to substantiate the existence of a real case or
controversy, as the Court may not issue advisory opinions. 183 The test
ensures that each party has "'such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.'"184
As explained above, an adversarial stance is clearly present in cases
challenging the constitutionality of self-enforcing tort laws that implement
social policy. The state has an interest in defending the law, which it
enacted in order to achieve a particular social goal. 85 Moreover, the state
officials who enacted the laws are duty bound to uphold the federal
Constitution.1 86 The state is thus better positioned than private litigants to
defend the constitutionality of such laws and has a direct interest in doing
so. 1 87 As Judge Benavides noted in Okpalobi, "I have no doubt that the
Attorney General's interest in the constitutionality of the state's laws
guaranteed a strong advocate and served to identify188and develop for this
Court, and the district court, the relevant arguments."'
It is appropriate to sue the governor or the attorney general even
where these officials are themselves not personally invested in defending
the statute.1 89 State officials are occasionally reluctant to defend state laws
against constitutional challenges, but this does not negate the fact that the
state has caused the plaintiffs' injury, nor does it undermine the
appropriateness of requiring the attorney general or the governor to defend
183. See, e.g., Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885) (holding that the Court has no power to declare any statute void unless the legal rights of
litigants are being adjudicated in an actual case or controversy).
184. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
185. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)
(noting that the "power to create and enforce a legal code" is among the most easily identifiable
sovereign interests and is "regularly at issue in constitutional litigation").
186. U.S. CONST. art. VI (requiring that state legislators and governors "shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution").
187. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) ("Because the State alone is entitled to
create a legal code, only the State has the kind of 'direct stake' identified in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S., at 740, in defending the standards embodied in that code."). Cf. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505
U.S. 788, 803 (1992) (O'Connor, J.) ("The Secretary certainly has an interest in defending her policy
determinations concerning the census; even though she cannot herself change the reapportionment, she
has an interest in litigating its accuracy.").
188. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 436 (5th Cir. 2001) (Benavides, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
189. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996) ("Although Governor Romer had been
on record opposing the adoption of Amendment 2, he was named in his official capacity as a defendant,
together with the Colorado Attorney General and the State of Colorado.").
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the state's conduct. 190 Romer v. Evans provides a particularly stark example
of this principle.' 9' In Romer, the Colorado governor had publicly opposed
the adoption of "Amendment 2," a state constitutional amendment that
nullified all state and local laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 192 Not only did Governor Romer oppose the amendment, but
he was also presumably charged with enforcing the very state laws that the
constitutional amendment was intended to nullify. 193 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court never questioned the propriety of suing Romer,
notwithstanding the state's lack of any formal role in "enforcing" the
amendment, the state's countervailing duty to enforce the nullified laws,
94
and Romer's officially stated opposition to the amendment.'
Paradoxically, concrete adverseness between the state and those
challenging the law may become particularly evident at the moment the
designated state official refuses to defend it. When New Jersey, over thenGovernor Whitman's veto, passed a "partial-birth abortion" ban that
contained several obvious constitutional infirmities, the New Jersey
attorney general refused to defend it.195 Unwavering in its determination to
defend the statute, the legislature appointed private counsel to represent the
state's interests, and the lawsuit proceeded with the attorney general as the
named defendant. 196 The legislature's tenaciousness in defending its statute
underscored the adverseness between the plaintiffs and the state in that
case.
2. Sovereign Immunity
In Okpalobi, the en banc plurality was wrong to conclude that
sovereign immunity should bar lawsuits challenging a state's enactment of
an unconstitutional self-executing, private liability scheme. 197 The Eleventh
190. Moreover, if the attorney general declines to defend a law, the case may be settled by a
consent decree in which the attorney general acknowledges (explicitly or implicitly) the statute's
unconstitutionality. See, e.g., United States v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 553 F.2d 992, 993-94 (5th
Cir. 1977) (describing a consent decree under which the school board "conceded the existence of a...
constitutional violation"). This may give sufficient comfort to those subject to the law to allow them to
continue engaging in the prohibited activity.
191. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 624-25.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 624 (noting that the amendment "prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial
action at any level of state or local government designed to protect ... gays and lesbians").
194. See id. at 625-26 (noting the governor's status as a defendant and continuing to adjudicate
the case without mention of any issues of standing).
195. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2000).
196. See id.
197. Compare Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 410-24 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (analyzing,
under the Eleventh Amendment doctrine articulated in Ex parte Young, the propriety of suing the
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Amendment has long been interpreted to protect a state's sovereign
immunity against more than just the suits that are described in the
Amendment itself. 198 Although the Amendment's text facially protects
states from being subjected to suits under federal diversity jurisdiction, the
Amendment has been held to protect a state from suits by its own
citizens. 199 It has also been extended to suits invoking federal question
rather than diversity jurisdiction.2 00 Unlike the limitations on a federal
court's power set forth in Article III, the Amendment does not prescribe an
absolute jurisdictional limit-states may waive their immunity by
consenting to suit and Congress may in certain instances abrogate states'
immunity. 20 Nevertheless, the Court has described sovereign immunity as
rooted in the very structure of the Constitution, asserting that "the scope of
the States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the
governor and other state officials to enjoin a tort liability statute), with id. at 436-41 (Benavides, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cruising the en bane plurality's analysis of Ex pane Young).
As Judge Benavides wrote, the plurality's approach "neglects our constitutional responsibility,
expressed in Young, to redress ongoing violations of federal law and thus insure the supremacy of the
Constitution." Id. at 437.
198.
The Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
There is substantial dispute as to whether this expansive interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment's scope is consistent with constitutional history and American federalism. See, e.g., Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760-61 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that expansive Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity is "at war with" the "essence of American federalism"); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-48 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that an expansive
Eleventh Amendment doctrine "diverges from text and history virtually without regard to underlying
purposes or genuinely fundamental interests"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1203-10 (2001) (questioning whether sovereign immunity is textually based in the
Constitution).
199.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XI, with Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1890)
(extending Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits by a state's own citizens).
200.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47, 54-55 (1996) (applying the Eleventh
Amendment to broadly protect states from suits, even in federal question cases).
201.
Congress can, subject to its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity when it is enforcing the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-56 (1976). But the Court has refused to
expand Congress's ability to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity beyond the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-73 (holding that constitutional provisions
antecedent to the Eleventh Amendment, such as the Indian Commerce Clause, could not be used to
abridge state immunity). As a further limitation, the Court requires "unequivocal statutory language"
from Congress before recognizing abrogation of state immunity. See Atascadero State Hosp,, 473 U.S.
at 246. Congress may, however, authorize suits against government officials rather than against the state
directly. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17 (suggesting that Congress has authority to authorize
federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young); id. at 173-74 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that, as
government officials never have authority to violate the Constitution, the Eleventh Amendment does
not prevent suits against them).
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implicit in the

Sovereign immunity has been used to support ever-growing
encroachments on the ability to vindicate federal rights when they are
violated by the states.20 3 This trend has included a narrowing of the
contexts in which Ex parte Young may be invoked-the Court has
established now-familiar categories of cases in which Article III power is
precluded against even state officials. For example, the Young doctrine may
not be applied if the relief sought is a retroactive award requiring the
payment of funds from the state treasury, 20 4 if Congress has otherwise
prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for redressing the violation of
federal law, 20 5 or if the case concerns a state's title to sovereign lands or
6
waters.

20

Despite this narrowing trend, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
expressed its commitment to the Young doctrine as necessary to ensure the
supremacy of federal law in other contexts. 20 7 The Court recently affirmed
the doctrine's vitality in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission.20 8 In Verizon, Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court in
holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity posed no bar to Verizon's suit
202. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 729. But see sources cited supra note 198 (supporting a contrary
position).
203. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 711-12 (refusing to allow plaintiffs to vindicate a state's alleged
violation of their federal rights, granted to them under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
204. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69, 677 (1974) (limiting Article III remedial power
over states to prospective injunctive relief rather than retroactive monetary awards).
205. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73-76 (holding that, as Congress had enacted a detailed remedial
scheme for the rights in question, Article IIl courts were powerless to supplant that regime).
206. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 283-88 (1997) (holding that, where a case
attempts to adjudicate a state's ownership of land or water, the outcome is as "intrusive" as a retroactive
monetary award).
207. See id. at 269, 281 (reiterating that the Ex parte Young doctrine has vitality where an
"allegation of an ongoing violation of federal law" requires prospective relief); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) ("Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights.").
208. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645-48 (2002). The facts of
Verizon may cast some doubt upon whether the decision truly reflects the robustness of the Young
doctrine. Although the majority opinion discusses the sovereign immunity question as a straightforward
application of Ex parte Young, the Court's willingness to subject a state to suit in federal court in this
instance may have been influenced by the nature of the suit. Compare id. (applying Ex parte Young),
with id. at 650-51 (Souter, J.) (noting that the issue in the case was one of a state interpreting federal
law pursuant to a congressional grant of authority, wherein the plaintiff was merely requesting a
"different adjudication of a federal question by means of appellate review"). Arguably, such a case does
not affront a state's dignity, unlike a suit in which a plaintiff asks a federal court to invalidate a state
law. Indeed, Justice Souter questioned whether, in light of these facts, Verizon implicated the Eleventh
Amendment at all. Id. at 649.
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to enforce its alleged rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.209
"In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh
Amendment bar to suit," the Court wrote, "a court need only conduct a
'straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing
violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
2 10
prospective.'
The Ex parte Young doctrine plays a particularly important role if
there is no state forum in which to seek redress 2 11 and if the rights protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment are at stake. 2 12 As Judge Benavides noted in
Okpalobi, suits challenging unconstitutional, self-enforcing tort liability
schemes "implicate[] the precise concerns regarding the supremacy of
constitutional rights that precipitated the Young line of cases." 2 13 Indeed, in
a passage strikingly evocative of the legislative arrogance exercised by the
Louisiana and Oklahoma legislatures, the respondent's brief in Ex parte
Young asserted:
It has become the aim of some legislatures to frame their
enactments with such cunning adroitness, and to hedge them about with
such savage and drastic penalties, as to make it impossible to test the
validity of such statutes in the courts save at a risk no prudent man
would dare to assume....
...
If it shall be held that a state statute may be so adroitly framed
that the Eleventh Amendment will bar any suit in the Federal courts of
equity jurisdiction, then no corporation nor individual will dare assume
the risk of the savage punishments which may be inflicted under such
acts, and legislation which flagrantly violates the provisions of the
Fourteenth214 Amendment will be made operative for all practical
purposes.

The Ex parte Young Court expressed similar concern that selfenforcing statutes would effectively deny a forum for challenging their
constitutionality:
Another obstacle to making the test [of constitutionality] on the part
of the company might be to find an agent or employ6 [sic] who would
209. See id. at 648.
210. Id. at 645 (quoting Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 296 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment)).
211. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 271-72 (Kennedy, J.). State fora are not reliably available
for pre-enforcement constitutional challenges to self-enforcing state tort laws. See infra note 300.
212. See id. at 279; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445,456 (1976).
213. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 438 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Benavides. J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
214. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 141-42 (1908) (quoting the respondent's brief).
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disobey the law, with a possible fine and imprisonment staring him in the
face if the act should be held valid. ...The wonder would be that a

single agent should be found ready to take the risk.2 15

The Court echoed the petitioners' fear that such a denial of judicial
relief might be the deliberate product of legislative arrogance. 216 The Court
also implied that, in order to ensure an opportunity to raise the
constitutional claims, a person would have to defy the statute repeatedly. If
the person violated the statute only once and then resumed compliance in
order to minimize the consequences, "the prosecutor might not avail
himself of the opportunity to make the test [at all, or] ...several years
might elapse before there was a final determination of the question. 2 17 The
2 18
Court considered this situation unacceptable.
The only salient feature of the Louisiana and Oklahoma laws
distinguishing them from the kind of statute challenged in Ex parte Young
is that the former place enforcement in private hands. But it would elevate
form over substance to allow a state to escape constitutional accountability
merely because of this "structural anomaly," 2 19 particularly where the
statute so clearly implicates the very concerns addressed by the Ex parte
Young Court. As Judge Benavides pointed out, "[T]he Act's unique
authorization of private strict liability lawsuits against providers of
abortions burdens the right to an abortion to the same extent as legislation
granting an Attorney General the power to prosecute or fine individuals for
performing abortions." 220 That procedural idiosyncrasy ought not to
"render Louisiana any more immune from challenge in federal court." 221
As with his Article III analysis, the flaw in Judge Jolly's Eleventh
Amendment analysis lies in his refusal to acknowledge the state's role in
215. Id. at 163-64. See also id. at 146 ("The necessary effect and result of such legislation must be
to preclude a resort to the courts (either state or Federal) for the purpose of testing its validity.").
216. See id. at 146. The Court stated that
"when the legislature, in an effort to prevent any inquiry of the validity of a particularstatute,
so burdens any challenge thereof in the courts that the party affected is necessarily
constrained to submit rather than take the chances of the penalties imposed, then it becomes a
serious question whether the party is not deprived of the equal protection of the laws."
Id. (quoting Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 102 (1901)) (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 163.
218.

See id.

219. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 438 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Benavides, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that constitutional rights are equally burdened under
a private regime).
220. Id.
221. Id.
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causing the plaintiffs' injury. 222 Judge Jolly's opinion takes the Young
fiction far too literally. As Judge Benavides wrote, "[T]he opinion's
connection requirement assumes that the fiction of Ex parte Young has
some real meaning in the Eleventh Amendment context-that it is the
individual officer, not the state itself that is the real party in interest. This is
223
simply not the case."
The Ex parte Young Court, like the townspeople observing the
emperor's new clothes, deliberately disregarded the obvious in order to
create an exception to sovereign immunity, all the while disclaiming any

limitation on a state's sovereignty.22 4 But the doctrine is called a "fiction"
for good reason. As the Supreme Court has recently pointed out, "[The]
commonsense observation of the State's real interest when its officers are
named as individuals has not escaped notice or comment from this Court,
either before or after Young." 225 Among the Justices of the Ex parte Young
Court, it was Justice Harlan in dissent who exposed the farce, pointing out
that the suit was brought against Attorney General Young "as, and only
226
because he was, Attorney General of Minnesota."
Commentators and court decisions have since highlighted numerous
incongruities belying the claim that the sued official does not represent the
state's interests. For example, while the Ex parte Young fiction purports to
remove the state as a player, a plaintiff must establish "state action" to
prove a constitutional violation. 227 Similarly, Rule 25(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the name of a state official is
222. Cf id. at 410-24 (Jolly, J.) (focusing on the fact that the state officials named as defendants
had no direct enforcement role in the statute).
223. See id. at 438 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. Compare Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908) (acknowledging that the plaintiffs "care
nothing about any action which Mr. Young might take or bring as an ordinary individual"), with id.
(characterizing the case as "not affect[ing] the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity" and as
merely addressing "an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of
the State to enforce [an unconstitutional] legislative enactment").
225. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997). See also Carlos Manuel
Vasquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 874 (2000) (describing
the evolution of Ex parte Young doctrine and the modem Court's recognition that suits against state
officials are tantamount to suits against the state).
226. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 173-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued that the
availability of a state forum in which to assert the act's unconstitutionality was sufficient, and that "a
decent respect for the States requires us to assume. .. that the state courts will enforce every right
secured by the Constitution." See id. at 176. A state forum may not always be available, however. Cf
infra note 300 (addressing the availability of state fora).
227. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982) ("There is a
well-recognized irony in Ex parte Young; unconstitutional conduct by a state officer may be 'state
action' for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment yet not attributable to the State for the purposes
of the Eleventh.").
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automatically substituted for the name of his predecessor in litigation
brought pursuant to the Ex parte Young exception. 228 This rule would make
no sense if it were simply a rogue state official, rather than the state, who
was responsible for the claimed injury. Moreover, the very fact that the
state officer is sued in that officer's official capacity gives rise to the
invocation of sovereign immunity; if the officer was merely sued in a
personal capacity, the state would have neither the need nor the basis to
claim irmnunity from such a suit.229 That the state official is acting on
behalf of the state is further underscored by the Court's rejection of claims
230
in such cases that officials were acting ultra vires.
These apparent paradoxes point to the obvious: in a suit brought under
the Ex parte Young exception, the plaintiff is essentially suing the state. In
recent years, the Court has openly conceded this point.2 31 Moreover, the
Court has implicitly recognized the limits of the fiction by largely
abandoning reliance on the "connection" requirement as a basis for
232
dismissing a case on sovereign immunity grounds.
In Okpalobi, Judge Jolly made much of the lack of a "connection"
between the plaintiffs' injury and the named defendants. 233 He read
"connection" to mean the state's ability to enforce the statute. 234 Ex parte
Young itself is unclear about how close or how direct a connection must
exist between the sued official and the challenged statute. The Young Court
228. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d). See also Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 439 (Benavides, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting the same). This procedure and the fiction that underlies it were well
illustrated in the challenge to New Jersey's "partial-birth abortion" ban. Attorney General Peter
Vemiero, in office when the ban became law, refused to defend the statute. See Planned Parenthood of
Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2000). Although the legislature appointed private
counsel to represent the state in defending the ban, the attorney general remained the named defendant.
See id. at 131. When the attorney general later left office, the lawsuit was recaptioned to reflect the new
attorney general, John Farmer, Jr. See id. at 127, 131.
229. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-68 (1985) (noting that officials sued in their
capacity as state officers may be able to raise personal immunity defenses based on their reasonable
reliance on existing law).
230. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11 (1984) (noting
that state officials act ultra vires only when they act without any authority whatsoever). In Pennhurst,
the Court held that the state officer named as a defendant "had nothing to gain personally" and therefore
was acting in his official capacity. See id. at 107-08.
231.
See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 57 n.2 (1986) (stating that "[a] suit against a state
officer in his official capacity is, of course, a suit against the State"); Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66
(noting that suits against state agents are just another way of pleading actions against the state).
232. Cf Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 439 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Judge Jolly's opinion does not cite a single modem Supreme Court case that relies on its connection
requirement to support dismissal of an Ex parte Young action on Eleventh Amendment grounds.").
233. See id. at 416-19 (Jolly, J.).
234. See id. at 416.
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noted that, in order to be subject to suit, a state official must have "some
connection with the enforcement of the act" being challenged. 23 5 The Court
distinguished Fitts v. McGhee-in which the Eleventh Amendment was
held to bar a suit against the attorney general and the governor of
Alabama 236-on the grounds that there was no "close official connection"
in Fitts between the alleged unconstitutional act and the defendant state
officers. 2 37 At the same time, the Ex parte Young Court said, the duty to
enforce a statute "is sufficiently apparent when such duty exists under the
general authority" of state law, even though such authority is not expressly
238
granted by the alleged unconstitutional statute.
Courts should not adhere to a rigid interpretation of the "connection"
requirement when they evaluate coercive, self-enforcing tort laws. A state
that enacts a self-executing scheme effectively enforces it simultaneously,
by attaching so great a risk to the targeted conduct that actual enforcement
is not needed to stop the plaintiffs from engaging in it. 239 The attorney
general or governor also retains the more general power to represent the
240
state's interest in enforcing the law by intervening in private suits.
Moreover, the modern Court acknowledges that the state is the real party in
interest in Ex parte Young cases. 24 1 This renders the "connection"
requirement, which was created to support the fiction, significantly less
important.
To the extent that the Court still endorses a "connection" inquiry, such
a connection appears to be subsumed by the elements required for Article
III standing. 242 In challenges to self-executing, private liability schemes,
there is a clear causal nexus between the plaintiffs' injury and the statethe plaintiffs' cessation of protected conduct is directly traceable to the
235.
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908).
236.
Id. at 156-57 (discussing Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 529-30, 533 (1899)).
237.
Id. (discussing Fitts, 172 U.S. at 529-30).
238.
Id. at 158 (noting that a state officer's enforcement power "might exist by reason of the
general duties of the officer to enforce [the statute] as a law of the State").
239.
See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 570-71 (S.D. Ohio 1979),

aff'd, 679 F.2d 656, 665 (6th Cir. 1982) (arguing that given the coercive effect of the challenged statute,
"enforcement arguably commenced against plaintiffs upon its enactment"). See also supra notes 214218 and accompanying text (describing the Court's concern in Ex parte Young regarding coercive and

unconstitutional state statutes).
240.

See supra notes 158-164 and accompanying text (discussing the rights and duties of

governors or attorneys general to enforce their states' laws and to intervene in suits as necessary).
241.
See supra text accompanying notes 231-232 (discussing how the Court recognizes the legal
fiction of Ex parte Young).
242.
See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 439 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Benavides, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the Court's modern Article IH standing
doctrine obviates the "connection" requirement under Ex parte Young).
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state's enactment of the unconstitutional, self-enforcing statute. This causal
nexus suffices to "connect" the state to the statute. The Ex parte Young
doctrine, as it is applied by the Court today, requires no more than this.
Pre-enforcement suits seeking only declarations of unconstitutionality
are particularly uncontroversial applications of Ex parte Young because
they are less apt to run afoul of core sovereignty concerns. In the first
place, they are clearly prospective. Thus, they do not implicate the
retroactive, monetary relief the Court has said is impermissible under Ex
parte Young. 24 3 The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that, under Young,
"the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent federal courts from granting
prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal
law." 244 Moreover, even when considering prospective relief, the Court has
distinguished between declaratory and injunctive relief, acknowledging that
a declaration of unconstitutionality is the less intrusive remedy. 245 The
declaratory judgment remedy was expressly intended as a "milder
alternative" to an injunction, one that does not carry the same concerns
about inappropriate interference with state autonomy. 246 In Steffel v.
Thompson, the Court recognized that "different considerations" underlie
the decision whether to grant declaratory relief.247 And although a federal
court has discretion to deny a declaratory judgment, 248 a claim for an
243. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (noting that a federal court's remedial
power under the Eleventh Amendment is limited to prospective injunctive relief rather than retroactive
monetary relief).
244. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (noting that such prospective relief is
implicitly required by the Supremacy Clause). See also, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (arguing that, in order to determine whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young
applies, "a court need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective' (quoting Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
245. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 469-71 (1974) (citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82, 124-26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
246. See Perez, 401 U.S. at 11. As Justice Brennan wrote:
[C]onsiderations of federalism are not controlling when no state prosecution is pending and
the only question is whether declaratory relief is appropriate. In such case [sic], the
congressional scheme that makes the federal courts the primary guardians of constitutional
rights, and the express congressional authorization of declaratory relief, afforded because it is
a less harsh and abrasive remedy than the injunction, become the factors of primary
significance.
Id. at 104.
247. See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 469-70 (1974). See also id. at 484 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(observing that a declaration of unconstitutionality may lead to various avenues of relief, all "reached
voluntarily by the States and [thus] completely consistent with the concepts of federalism").
248. The Court summarized its view of such discretion in Green v. Mansour:
[W]e have also held that the declaratory judgment statute "is an enabling Act, which confers a
discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant." The propriety of
issuing a declaratory judgment may depend upon equitable considerations, and is also
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ongoing constitutional violation by a state provides a strong basis for such
relief.2 49
To reject sovereign immunity as a bar to suits against self-executing,
private liability schemes is to acknowledge the state's responsibility in
causing the plaintiffs injury. But should the state be called upon to defend
every unconstitutional law that it enacts? Or should it be held accountable
only where a law addresses an issue of considerable public interest?
The Fifth Circuit panel in Okpalobi adopted the latter approach in
deciding that sovereign immunity did not bar the suit. The panel found
Louisiana's anti-abortion tort statute was "'designed to implement and
serve the public interest of the state,"' thereby justifying suit against the
attorney general and governor.25 ° The court relied upon Allied Artists
Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes,25 1 a 1979 federal district court opinion from the
Southern District of Ohio, which examined "the nature of the law and its
place on the continuum between public regulation and private action" to
determine whether sovereign immunity applied.25 2 In Allied Artists, the
court distinguished a statute that "regulates relationships between private
parties" from a statute that "create[s] rights and relationships of substantial
public interest." 253 The court contended that the public interest underlying a
statute of the former kind could be "amply protected" through private
litigation, whereas the public interest in a statute affecting substantial
public rights could not.254 Statutes addressing a matter of substantial public
interest presented a "real, not ephemeral, likelihood" that the powers of the
named state defendants "will be employed against plaintiffs' interests. 2 55
The court thus implied that the state's likely involvement in implementing
such statutes satisfied the "connection" requirement of Ex parte Young.
"informed by the teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal
judicial power."
Green, 474 U.S. at 72 (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241, 243 (1952)).
249. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 940 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1991). For example, in
Mobil Oil, the Fourth Circuit stated,
We think that Mobil's case is precisely the one for which the Declaratory Judgments [sic] Act
was designed. Public policy should encourage a person aggrieved by laws he considers
unconstitutional to seek a declaratory judgment against the arm of the state entrusted with the
state's enforcement power, all the while complying with the challenged law, rather than to
deliberately break the law and take his chances in the ensuing suit or prosecution.
Id.
250. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 347 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 569 (S.D. Ohio 1979), affd, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982)).
251.

Allied Artists PicturesCorp., 473 F. Supp. 560.

252.
253.

Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 345-47 (summarizing the analysis in Allied Artists).
Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 473 F. Supp. at 568.

254.

See id.

255.

Id.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:753

The Allied Artists test has the appeal of appearing to retain the
connection-to-enforcement requirement of Ex parte Young, by assuming
that a greater threat of state intervention exists in a private enforcement
scheme if the law regulates a matter of public concern. The test, however,
relies on an illusory distinction among statutes, rendering the test ultimately
unworkable. The statute at issue in Allied Artists itself addressed bidding
practices among motion picture distributors and exhibitors. 256 The district
court found that this statute fell on the public policy end of the spectrum, as
it "amount[ed] to state regulation of movie producers and distributors,"
which was an "exercise of the state's regulatory power ...designed to
implement and serve the public interest of Ohio." 25 7 The court concluded
this despite the lack of any state-enforced penalties in the statute. 25 8 The
as
court, however, just as easily could have described the statutory scheme
259
parties."
private
between
"relationships
merely regulating contractual
The court in Allied Artists cited another statute that further
demonstrates the illusory distinction between laws implementing public
policy and those regulating private behavior. The Allied Artists court
distinguished a New York statute that permitted a wife, but not a husband,
to recover from her spouse the costs she incurred in a divorce action. 260 In
the case challenging that statute, the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York rejected the challenge on Eleventh Amendment
grounds, finding no sufficient connection between the named defendantsthe attorney general and the governor-and the statute. 261 The court in
Allied Artists considered this statute to be at the private "end of the
continuum"-a statute that merely "regulates relationships between private
256. See id. at 561-62 (describing the statute that prohibited "blind bidding," a process in which
theatre owners were forced to bid on exhibition rights without having seen the movies themselves).
257. See id. at 569. The Sixth Circuit agreed. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d
656, 665 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982). In affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit stated, "Even in the
absence of specific state enforcement provisions, the substantial public interest in enforcing the trade
practices legislation involved here places a significant obligation upon the Governor to use his general
authority to see that state laws are enforced." Id.
258. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 473 F. Supp. at 561-62 (reprinting the statute in suit, which
lacks any criminal penalty).
259. See id. at 568. Indeed, the defendants in Allied Artists argued for this characterization of the
statute. See id. at 569.
260. See id. at 567 (discussing Gras v. Stevens, 415 F. Supp. 1148, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(deciding the issue of sovereign immunity in a constitutional challenge to N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
237)).
261. See Gras, 415 F. Supp. at 1152. The court in Gras stated, "[W]e know of no case in which
the general duty of a governor to enforce state laws has been held sufficient to make him a proper party
defendant in a civil rights action attacking the constitutionality of a state statute concerning.., private
civil actions." Id.
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parties." 262 Of course, this New York statute could just as easily be
described as addressing public policy concerns, such as the
disproportionate economic impact of divorce upon women. Thus, the Allied
Artists test seems to invite a semantic game in which courts could reach
opposite results depending on how they characterize the interest underlying
the statute at issue.
The Allied Artists test relies on an artificial public-private dichotomy
that has been rightfully called into question. 263 Courts need not wrestle with
this problematic distinction when addressing acts of legislative arrogance.

When a state legislature enacts a law that unconstitutionally forces some of
its citizens to desist from certain actions, we should assume that it has some
public policy justification for doing so. That interest on the part of the state
is also what makes it appropriate to hold the state constitutionally
264
accountable for its actions.
IV. STATE LEGISLATIVE ARROGANCE: A THREAT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
To a significant degree, our very constitutional structure was designed
to address the dangers of legislative arrogance. 265 James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton were deeply wary of legislative power, and their
apprehension reverberates through the Federalist Papers.266 They
distrusted legislators' loyalty to majoritarian interests, recognizing that this
267
fidelity could too easily be employed to infringe on individual rights.
262.
See Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 473 F. Supp. at 568-69.
263.
See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 16, at 1446-48 (examining whether the distinction in
constitutional law between state action and private action is illusory and whether such a distinction
should be abandoned).
264.
The state's essential role in acts of legislative arrogance also alleviates concern over a
slippery slope that abandonment of the public-private distinction might invite in other contexts. Cf id.
at 1448 (discussing the need for the state action doctrine as a guard against turning "every question of
government policy ... [into] a constitutional issue").
265.
Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (noting that defining the scope of federal
constitutional limits on state power "was foremost in the minds of the [F]ramers").
266. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison), supra note 7, at 315 (noting "the
propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent
passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders, into intemperate and pernicious resolutions").
267.
See Jack N. Rakove, Law and Political Culture: The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 473, 492 (1988). See also Calabresi, supra note 16, at 122-23 & n.139 (discussing factors
explaining American legislative propensities to enact "hasty and ill-considered" laws that infringe on
fundamental rights). As Madison stated, "[Tlhe invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended,
not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents." Letter from James
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Within the architecture of the Constitution, federal courts bear the burden
of curbing legislative arrogance.
Legislative arrogance at the state level implicates two constitutional
principles: the proper balance of power among coordinate branches of
government, and the proper division of authority between federal and state
governments. Madison and Hamilton were concerned with each of these.
Their attentiveness in the FederalistPapers to the potential for legislative
tyranny and the threat it poses to these constitutional principles highlights
the importance of the federal judiciary as a check on acts of legislative
arrogance like those exercised in Louisiana and Oklahoma.
Both Hamilton and Madison argued for the importance of bolstering
the executive and judicial branches, particularly the latter, in order to curb
legislative abuses. 268 Madison argued that the judiciary was necessary "'to
restrain the legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate
departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from passing laws
unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form."' 269 Both men saw the
judiciary as important, but ultimately weak. "[T]he supposed danger of
judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority, which has been upon
270
many occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom," wrote Hamilton.
"Particular misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the
legislature may now and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as
to amount to an inconvenience, or in any sensible degree to affect the order
27 1
of the political system."
Legislative arrogance, far more than judicial arrogance, was the thing
to be feared.27 2 Already susceptible to violating the Constitution under
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 PAPERS OF MADISON 298 (Robert A. Rutland et al.
eds., 1977); Rakove, supra, at 492 (quoting same).
268. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 7, at 393 (extolling the
power of the judiciary to serve as a "barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative
body"); Rakove, supra note 267, at 494-95 (suggesting that Madison viewed the judiciary as fulfilling a
more important role in a federalist system than the executive and noting Madison's wariness of
"legislative usurpations").
269. Rakove, supra note 267, at 493 (quoting speeches of James Madison).
270.

THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 7, at 411.

271. Id. Hamilton famously called the judiciary "the least dangerous" branch of the federal
government-the branch least likely to endanger constitutional rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 7, at 393. To the extent that the Framers were at all concerned with
judicial power, they were not motivated to shield Congress's enactments from constitutional review,
much less to protect the acts of state legislatures from constitutional challenge. See Mickenberg, supra
note 5, at 511-12.
272. Commentators have pointed to the propensity of legislatures to shirk constitutional
responsibility in other contexts. Guido Calabresi, for example, has discussed what he calls legislative
"hiding," in which legislatures avoid "difficult issues that may be politically dangerous to decide
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majoritarian pressure, legislators, elected for limited terms, could not be
expected to police themselves. 273 "[O]n account of the natural propensity of
[legislative] bodies to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear,
that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice,"
Hamilton warned.274 The judiciary was the branch far better equipped to
hear the "voice both of law and of equity. 2 75
Madison, in particular, was especially mindful of the unique concerns
posed by state legislative arrogance and the need to hold states
276
constitutionally accountable in order to protect individual rights.
Madison saw the states as potential hotbeds for political factions, warning
of "[tihe influence of factious leaders [who] may kindle a flame within
their particular States." 277 For Madison, the Union served as a check upon
the "mischiefs" of factions within the states, which otherwise could ignite
"common passion" among "a majority of the whole," with nothing to
prevent the majority from "sacrific[ing] the weaker party or an obnoxious
individual. 2 78 Moreover, Madison believed that final authority as to the
division of power between the federal and state governments must lie with
the federal government. 279 Without federal supremacy, Madison contended,
openly." See Calabresi, supra note 16, at 119 (noting that judicial enforcement is necessary to ensure
accountability). For example, legislatures may fail to delegate authority in a sufficiently explicit
manner, or they may delegate functions to private entities that are not sufficiently accountable to the
public. See id. at 104; Metzger, supra note 16, at 1394-1400 (analyzing governmental privatization as
legislative avoidance of constitutional accountability). Likewise, legislatures may persistently refuse to
repeal old laws. See Calabresi, supra note 16, at 104.
273.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 7, at 410 (noting that, "[flrom a
body which had had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to
temper and moderate them in the application," and that "[s]till less could it be expected, that men who
had infringed the [C]onstitution, in the character of legislators, would be disposed to repair the breach,
in the character of judges.").
274.
Id.
275.
See id. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 7, at 393.
276.
See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 267, at 496 (noting Madison's "ever unflattering portrait of
state legislators" and his observation that "the parochialism of state lawmakers would not magically
disappear with the adoption of the Constitution" such that "individual and minority rights within the
states would remain vulnerable to repeated violations"). See also Bernard W. Bell, Marbury v. Madison
and the Madisonian Vision, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197,234 (2003) (discussing threats posed by state
parochialism to federal constitutional rights).
277.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 7, at 48.
278.
Id. at 46. See also Rakove, supra note 267, at 479-80, 496-97 (discussing Madison's "acute
diagnosis of the parochial allegiances of state legislators and citizens").
279.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 7. See also GARRY WILLS, A
NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 80-81 (1999) (arguing that
Madison, concerned about state self-interest, adhered firmly to the view that final authority should rest
with the federal government even as he soothed the states with the assurance of "residual" retained
sovereignty).
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the world would have seen for the first time, a system of government
founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government;
it would have seen the authority of the whole society every where
subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen
a monster in
280
which the head was under the direction of the members.
The federal judiciary was to serve as the critical check on state
legislatures. As Hamilton explained, "[T]here ought always to be a
constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions. What
for instance would avail restrictions on the authority of the State
legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance
of them?" 28' The mode of enforcement provided in the Constitution was
"an authority in the federal courts, to over-rule such as might be in manifest
282
contravention of the articles of union."
In Marbury v. Madison283 and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,284 the

Supreme Court laid claim to its position among the coordinate branches as
the final authority in matters of constitutional interpretation. In these
decisions, the Court reaffirmed the importance of federal supremacy and
the place of state legislatures within the constitutional landscape, declaring
that "the legislatures of the states.. . in every case are, under the
[C]onstitution, bound by the paramount authority of the United
States ... -"285 The Court reiterated that federal supremacy guards against
"state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests," ensures "uniformity
of decisions throughout the whole United States," and guarantees that
constitutional protections redound to the "common and equal benefit of all
of the people of the United States." 286 The Court thus took on the role that
Hamilton and Madison had envisioned for it: a check on potential
legislative defiance of the Constitution. To tolerate acts of defiance by state
legislatures that disagree with the Supreme Court's rulings would run afoul
of Justice Marshall's famous reminder in Marbury: "It is emphatically the
280.

THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison), supra note 7, at 231. See also WILLS, supra note

279, at 81 (quoting the same); THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 7 (defending
need for federal supremacy).
281. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 7, at 403.
282. See id. Hamilton suggested that a federal veto over state laws could serve as a check on state
power. Id. (proposing a "direct negative on the State laws" as an option for ensuring federal
supremacy). Madison had originally argued for such a federal governmental veto, but ultimately settled
for the Supremacy Clause with anticipated Supreme Court review. See WILLS, supra note 279, at 7778, 82; Rakove, supra note 267, at 497-98.
283. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
284. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheaton) 304 (1816).
285. Martin, 14 U.S. at 343-44.
286. Id. at 347-48.
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province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.... [And] if a law be in opposition to the [C]onstitution ...the court

must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of
287
the very essence of judicial duty."
These important functions of federal supremacy are undermined by
the Louisiana and Oklahoma legislatures' acts of legislative arrogance. In
both states, local antichoice sentiment-out of step with the Court's
protection of individual rights-prevailed. In Oklahoma, teenagers seeking
abortions were subjected to a standard for parental involvement that did not
comply with what the Supreme Court has said is necessary to protect their
constitutional rights. 288 When courts allow a state legislature to defy the
Constitution in this way and fail to hold it accountable, they give the state
legislature "a practical and real omnipotence." 28 9 The Fifth Circuit's meek
disavowal of its duty to hold the Louisiana legislature accountable in
'29 0
Okpalobi-"we are powerless to act except to say that we cannot act" ignores the constitutionally significant implications of the state legislature's
conduct.

29 1

The Supreme Court has not retreated from constitutional principles in
a way that would support the Fifth and Tenth Circuits' refusal to hold the
Louisiana and Oklahoma legislatures constitutionally accountable.
Certainly when it comes to the balance of power between the legislative
and judicial branches, the Court has on numerous recent occasions
emphatically asserted its role as the final arbiter of constitutional
interpretation. For example, in United States v. Lopez, the Court declared
that "'whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently
See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78.
287.
288.
See supra Part [.B (discussing the Oklahoma statute). In 2005, the Oklahoma Legislature
enacted a parental involvement law that, unlike the 2001 law, includes a medical emergency exception
and a judicial bypass process, and also carries criminal penalties directly enforced by the state. See
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-740.1 to -740.5. (West Supp. 2006) (discussing the statutory
amendments). This statute is currently under challenge, although the law is in effect. See Nova Health
Sys. v. Edmonson, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1235-40, 1242-44 (N.D. Okla. 2005) (denying the plaintiffs
motion to enjoin enforcement of the amended Oklahoma statute and denying injunctive relief pending
appeal).
See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
289.
290. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Cf. id. at 433
(Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I believe the duty of this Court to protect
constitutional rights and thereby ensure the supremacy of the Constitution over state laws outweighs the
sovereign right of states to immunity from suit in federal court.").
291.
See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) ("If the
legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and
destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the [C]onstitution itself becomes a solemn
mockery ... ").
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to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is
ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled
finally only by this Court.' '' 292 The Court has asserted its power to decide
whether particular activities affect interstate commerce even when
Congress makes detailed and specific findings documenting such effects.293
In fact, the Rehnquist Court's expansive view of its own power has fueled
294
allegations that the Court exceeded its authority in many of these cases.
The Court's decisions in Lopez and United States v. Morrison reflect
its current tendency to skew the balance toward the states when weighing
close cases of federal versus state authority. 295 But they also reflect the
Court's perception of the limits of legislative power. "Under our written
Constitution," the Court admonished in Morrison, "the limitation of
296
congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace."
Emphatically reaffirming the Court's role as the "ultimate expositor of the
constitutional text," the Court invoked Madison and Hamilton's fears of
legislative arrogance: "[T]he Framers adopted a written Constitution that
further divided authority at the federal level so that the Constitution's
provisions would not be defined solely by the political branches nor the
scope of legislative power limited only by public opinion and the
legislature's self-restraint. '297 City of Boerne v. Flores underscores the
current Court's remarkable readiness to view legislation that is based on
disagreement with the Court's rulings as legislative arrogance.29 8 Thus, the
292. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241,273 (1964)).
293. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
294.

See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 99-102

(1999); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); Vicki C.
Jackson, Principleand Compromise in ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953 (2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal
Protectionby Law: FederalAntidiscrimination LegislationAfter Morrison and Kimmel, 110 YALE L.J.
441 (2000).
295. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 ("[T]he concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress
might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national
and local authority seems well founded.").
296. See id. at 616.
297. See id. at 616 n.7 (emphasis added).
298. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512, 536 (1997). In Boerne, the Court ruled that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act-Congress's direct response to the Court's much-criticized
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)-exceeded Congress's powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512, 536. What Congress did
in enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act cannot be compared with the legislative arrogance
exercised by Louisiana's and Oklahoma's legislatures.
First, it is debatable whether Congress in fact exceeded its powers by conferring more protection
to religious exercise than the Court said is constitutionally required. Thus, some of the Court's recent
restrictions of Congress's power could be seen as driven more by the Court's own political agenda than
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Court's recent treatment of the proper balance of power among coordinate
branches of government suggests that the Court would mandate that federal
courts halt acts of constitutional disobedience by states.
The Court's reluctance to defer to the political branches'
interpretations of the Constitution applies with much greater force to the
kind of legislative arrogance exercised by Louisiana and Oklahoma. The
federal courts' duty to check legislative power is especially compelling
when legislative acts impinge on, rather than expand on, constitutional
freedoms. Judicial intervention is critical in such cases in order to protect
minorities from the tyranny of the majority.2 99 If the Court believed that
Congress overstepped its bounds in Morrison and Lopez, it should without
question view state legislative arrogance as an impermissible appropriation
300
of power by state government.
by the belief that Congress was acting arrogantly. Cf generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005) (arguing that the Court should grant greater

deference to Congress). Louisiana and Oklahoma's infringement of individual rights that the Court has
said are constitutionally protected is a very different matter than that raised in City of Boerne.
Second, the states' legislative arrogance lies not merely with their direct contravention of the
Court's rulings but with their refusal to submit these acts of defiance to judicial scrutiny. See infra note
321 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Parker's observation that Oklahoma's statute was designed
to evade judicial review). South Dakota's recent enactment of a near-total ban on abortions, in contrast,
is an example of legislative defiance that nevertheless contemplates judicial review. See Women's
Health and Human Life Protection Act, H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg. Sess. (S.D. 2006) (enacted) (making
performance of an abortion--except to save a woman's life-a felony); John Holusha, South Dakota
Governor Signs Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006, Washington Section (describing Governor
Rounds's acknowledgement that the law's implementation would be delayed pending a court
challenge).
299. See, e.g., Gerald E. Rosen & Kyle W. Harding, Reflections upon Judicial Independence as
We Approach the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison: Safeguarding the Constitution's "Crown
Jewel," 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 798 (2002) ("[G]enuflecting before polling data is not-and must
not be-part of a judge's job description.... [I]f a popular law clearly contradicts constitutional
freedoms, the Court has a duty to strike it down.").
300. The federal courts' role in curbing legislative arrogance is critical notwithstanding the
potential availability of state fora in which to bring constitutional challenges. First, state courts often are
not available: many state courts would dismiss constitutional challenges to these statutes by applying
justiciability principles that parallel the requirements of Article 111, see, e.g., supra note 12, even though
they are not required to do so, see Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989). Second, access to
state fora is uncertain and contingent at best, even in states that generally employ more generous
justiciability doctrines. Some states, for example, will not apply their own, more generous, standing
doctrines to claims brought under the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Urban League of Essex County v.
Twp. of Mahwah, 370 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). See also Susan N. Herman,
Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1057, 1116-17 & n.246 (1989)
(discussing cases). Moreover, the typical expansions of standing principles-such as relaxing the
injury-in-fact requirement, disregarding mootness, or permitting advisory opinions-generally would
not help plaintiffs bringing constitutional challenges to self-enforcing tort laws. See, e.g., Asarco, 490
U.S. at 616-17 (noting that it was a state court's prerogative to hear generalized grievances brought by
taxpayers and a teachers association which would have been insufficient under Article III); DeFunis v.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:753

When considering the proper division of power between federal and
state governments under our federalist system, the current Court appears
increasingly willing to sacrifice federal supremacy to state sovereignty.30 1
But a closer look at recent Supreme Court erosions of federal supremacy
suggests the Court is observing a distinction between federal legislative
supremacy and federal judicial supremacy as applied to constitutional
interpretation and enforcement. In these decisions, the Court has been
systematically "restricting the powers of Congress and enlarging the areas
where the states can escape effective control by Congress." 302 These cases
thus reflect the Court's eagerness to protect the states from congressional
mandates where it believes Congress has encroached on powers
constitutionally meant to be retained by the states. In Morrison and Lopez,
for example, the Court emphasized that the Founders deliberately reposed
the police power in the states, not in the federal government. 30 3 Recent
sovereign immunity decisions show that the Court continues to protect the
states from what it perceives as congressional overreaching.30 4 In striking
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (holding that the claim before it was moot under Article III,
although the claim was justiciable under Washington state law); In re Hines, 732 N.E.2d 274, 275
(Mass. 2000) (holding that only the legislature, govemor, and executive council-not private citizensmay seek advisory opinions, and only in limited circumstances). See also William A. Fletcher, The
"Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 263, 285 (1990) (pointing out that advisory opinions are not adequate substitutes for decisions in
litigated cases as they are not binding on subsequent courts and lack res judicata and collateral estoppel
effect). Third, a plaintiff who brings a federal constitutional claim in state court because Article III
standing is lacking cannot appeal an adverse decision to the Supreme Court (although the defendants
could). See Fletcher, supra, at 281-82 (arguing that state courts should be required to adhere to Article
IlI case or controversy requirements when adjudicating questions of federal law, in part to avoid this
anomalous result). Finally, federal courts may simply be the more appropriate forum in which to
vindicate federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neofederalist View of Article III:
Separating the Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985) (arguing that the Framers
intended to require that some federal court be open to hear and resolve any given federal question);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 233 (1988) (proposing that litigants bringing federal constitutional claims should generally be able
to choose their forum, federal or state); Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105
(1977) (arguing that state courts will not protect federal constitutional rights as forcefully as would
federal district courts).
301.
See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES 4 (2002) ("[T]he sovereign immunity of the states is at the center of an explosive
package disturbing the ascendancy of the nation over its parts.").
302.
Id. at 3-4.
303.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 566 (1995).
304.
See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000) (holding that Congress
could not abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress lacked the power to subject states to private
damage suits under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (holding that Congress lacked the power to subject states
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the balance in the states' favor, the Court simultaneously has solidified
its
30 5
own position as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution's meaning.
The current Court's view of federal supremacy thus sees Congress's
power vis-a-vis the states as comparatively weak or limited when
contrasted with that of the Supreme Court. In New York v. United States,
for example, the Court recently drew an explicit distinction between the
power of "federal courts to order state officials to comply with federal law"
and the power of Congress to do so. 30 6 The Court explained,
[T]he text of the Constitution plainly confers this authority on the federal
courts .... [it] contains no analogous grant of authority to Congress.
Moreover, the Supremacy Clause makes federal law paramount over the
contrary positions of state officials; the power of federal courts to
enforce federal law
thus presupposes some authority to order state
30 7
officials to comply.

No matter how one views the Court's recent balancing of state and
congressional power, 30 8 state legislative arrogance presents the Court with
a very different question. Recent decisions do not foretell with certainty
how the Court would answer it. But the Court's insistence on its superiority
in matters of constitutional interpretation suggests that it would look
askance at state legislatures' attempts to usurp the Court's own power by
first defying its rulings and then deliberately circumventing federal judicial
to patent infringement suits under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress could not abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act). While not all of the Court's recent
expansions of sovereign immunity fit this pattern, they also do not reveal a willingness on the Court's
part to immunize state legislative defiance of the Court's own constitutional interpretations. See
generally NOONAN, supra note 301 (discussing the Court's recent sovereignty immunity rulings);
Chemerinsky, supra note 198 (same).
305. Cf Mark R. Killenbeck, Madison, M'Culloch, and Matters of Judicial Cognizance: Some
Thoughts on the Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, 55 ARK. L. REV. 901, 901-02 (2003) (noting that
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas have taken "a judicial supremacy
approach," asserting "that they have a constitutionally mandated responsibility to insure that federal
initiatives in fact regulate commerce and in so doing do not violate the dignity of the sovereign states").
But see Bell, supra note 276, at 213 (arguing that it is a recent phenomenon that the Court shows
deference to state sovereignty over Congress's attempts to define the substantive scope of rights).
306. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 179 (1992).
307. See id. But see id. at 199-207 & n.3 (White, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that history supports a more expansive understanding of congressional authority than that
offered by the majority); id. at 210-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
308. The Court's expansion of state sovereign immunity at the expense of federal rights is subject
to powerful criticism. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 198, at 1201-10 (arguing that "[s]overeign
immunity is an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be eliminated from American law" and
questioning any constitutional basis for the doctrine).
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review. 30 9 The Court historically has been hostile to open disobedience of
its rulings by state legislatures. For example, in Cooper v. Aaron, the Court
forcefully condemned the Arkansas legislature's defiance of its decision in
Brown v. Board of Education.3 10 Pointing the blame for the state's
disastrous failure to desegregate its schools squarely at the Arkansas
legislature and governor, 31 ' the Court emphasized the importance of
holding the state constitutionally accountable: "'If the legislatures of the
several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United
States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments,"' the Court
warned, "'the [C]onstitution itself becomes a solemn mockery."' 3 12 The
Court identified the state's act of legislative arrogance as a failure of
loyalty to the Constitution: "No state legislator or executive or judicial
officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking
313
to support it."
Romer v. Evans offers a more recent indication that the Court
continues to frown upon state legislative disregard for its rulings. 314 In
Romer, the Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that
prevented state and local government from enforcing laws forbidding
discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Court characterized the
amendment as a defiance of Court-established constitutional norms,
asserting that it "confounds th[e] normal process" of equal protection
309. Because legislative arrogance entails ignoring pronouncements the Supreme Court has
already made on controversial issues, the Court has no reason to engage in the kind of avoidance
techniques it might otherwise use to avoid deciding contentious questions. See generally LISA A.
KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW (2001).

Of course, Louisiana's and Oklahoma's particular acts of legislative arrogance would pose an
interesting conundrum for some members of the current Court. Among the Justices who have been the
most zealous in curbing perceived legislative arrogance by Congress are the ones who believe that Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), should be overturned. But one can imagine other uses of the same
legislative paradigm that would not pose the same dilemma for these Justices. See supra notes 31-35
and accompanying text (illustrating other potential applications for legislative arrogance).
310. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). In Cooper, the Court considered Arkansas's
actions to be a repudiation of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), and "the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution" which
"has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature
of our constitutional system." Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
311.
Cooper, 358 U.S. 15 (asserting that the deplorable conditions in Arkansas schools were
"directly traceable to the actions of legislators and executive officials of the State of Arkansas, taken in
their official capacities, which reflect their own determination to resist this Court's decision in the
Brown case").
312. See id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809) (Marshall,
C.J.)).
313. See id.
314. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996).
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review to impose "a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group." 315 The Court noted that such legislative arrogance was
"unprecedented in our jurisprudence."3t 6 The Court emphasized, "It is not
within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort."3 '17
In the face of the Court's strong reaffirmations of the federal
judiciary's role to curb legislative encroachments on the Constitution, the
Fifth and Tenth Circuits' timidity in dealing with obvious acts of state
legislative arrogance is somewhat mystifying. It seems troublingly
parochial for a federal court to adhere so rigidly to the letter of Article III
standing requirements and the Ex parte Young fiction as to allow legislative
acts that directly disregard fundamental constitutional principles. Such
formalism seems especially unwarranted when applied to the Ex parte
Young doctrine, whose fiction was created for the very purpose of
3 18
addressing this kind of legislative recalcitrance.
Allowing state legislatures to ignore the Supreme Court's
constitutional interpretations invites a unique kind of crisis far worse than if
Congress alone did so. Hamilton warned of the "hydra in government" that
would result if state courts were permitted to reach their own
interpretations of the Constitution. 319 This same chaos, or worse, would
follow if state legislatures could disregard the Supreme Court's
constitutional rulings with impunity. Justice Holmes shared this concern,
asserting, "I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost
our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would
be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the
320
several States."
Legislative arrogance implicates more than the enactment of brazenly
unconstitutional state laws, which federal courts can and routinely do
invalidate. It also implicates the legislature's refusal to recognize its own
place in the constitutional hierarchy and to submit its acts to the scrutiny of
the federal courts. Judge Parker, who dissented in Okpalobi, specifically
condemned this aspect of the Louisiana legislature's actions:
By privatizing the enforcement of unlimited monetary damages, which is
undoubtedly a state-sanctioned penalty, the State is attempting to avoid
315. Id. at 632-33.
316. See id. at 633.
317. Id.
318. See supra notes 211-218 and accompanying text (discussing Ex parte Young).
319. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 7, at 403.
320. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291,
295-96 (1920).
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defending a patently unconstitutional law while simultaneously effecting
a coercive impact so drastic that abortion providers have no choice but to
cease operations. This purpose is illegitimate not only because Act 825
unduly burdens a constitutionally
protected right, but also because it
321
seeks to evade judicial review.
The Court has created and employed timeworn legal devices
specifically to ensure states' constitutional accountability and prevent such
evasions of judicial review. The Ex parte Young doctrine itself has survived
for almost one hundred years. Similarly, the doctrine of state action exists
to ensure that the government cannot escape constitutional accountability
by delegating authority to the private sphere or by aiding private
infringement of constitutionally protected rights. 322 In Shelley v. Kraemer,
the Court found state action in the judicial enforcement of private, racially
restrictive covenants-this judicial enforcement constituted the sole link
between the private agreements and the state. 323 Nevertheless, the Court
found state action, stressing that state action "refers to exertions of state
power in all forms." 324 Legislative arrogance implicates the state much
more directly. State courts are charged with enforcing the statute by
hearing the private suits it authorizes, but, more importantly, the state is
responsible for creating the entire liability scheme. Like the state action
doctrine, principles of case or controversy and the Ex parte Young doctrine
have the flexibility to ensure constitutional accountability where the state is
not just complicit in, but the enabler of, private infringement of
constitutional rights.
Federal courts should not shirk their responsibility to employ these
doctrines to hold recalcitrant state legislatures constitutionally accountable
for acts of legislative arrogance. Especially where such arrogance infringes
individual rights, federal courts' role as a check on legislatures'
overassertive impulses is critical. As Justice Breyer has observed, an
independent judiciary fulfills its role as protector of "democratically
321.
322.

See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Parker, J., dissenting).
But see Metzger, supra note 16, at 1421-37 (arguing that the existing state action doctrine is

not up to the task of ensuring constitutional accountability).
323. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948). See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 374-75, 378-79 (1967) (upholding the state court's finding that a provision of the California
Constitution embodied the state's unconstitutional facilitation of private discrimination); id. at 379-81

(discussing additional cases invalidating state-supported private discrimination).
324.
See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20. See also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65
(1964) (asserting that a state court's application of state law in a private lawsuit constitutes state action
subject to First Amendment requirements). As the New York Times Co. Court held, "It matters not that
the law has been applied in a civil action .... The test is not the form in which state power has been
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised." Id. at 265.
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structured government and of basic liberties... by helping gradually to
develop among citizens and legislators liberty-protecting habits based in
part upon their expectation that liberty-infringing laws will turn out not to
325
be laws."
The results of past Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions
illustrate that the sky has not fallen when states have been called upon to
defend the constitutionality of privately enforced statutes in preenforcement actions. Tort liability in the context of legislatively enacted
social policy is not a totally new concept, although such liability has
typically been ancillary to state enforcement mechanisms such as criminal
penalties. In such cases, courts have usually addressed the tort provisions,
even if the named defendants had no power to enforce them. For example,
many "partial-birth abortion" bans have not only included criminal
penalties, but have also allowed the woman's sexual partner and/or her
parents to sue for damages if they did not consent to the abortion.3 26 In only
two such cases did courts refuse to rule on the civil liability provision on
the grounds of sovereign immunity or lack of standing.31 7 Other courts
struck down the statutes in their entirety, even though the named
defendants had no power to enforce the civil liability provisions. 328 Some
courts even addressed the civil liability provisions expressly. 329 Likewise,
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
husband-notification provision in Pennsylvania's omnibus abortion act
provided only for a private cause of action by the husband and possible
license revocation. 33 ° The Supreme Court invalidated the provision without
considering whether the plaintiffs had sued the proper defendants, even
325.
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review: A PracticingJudge's Perspective, 78 TEX. L. REV. 761,
774 (2000).
326. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1531(c) (Supp. 2003) (giving a private right of action in certain cases
to the "father" and "maternal grandparents" of the fetus); LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.35.16(C) (2001)
(same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12-4 (2005) (same).
327. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 605-06 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Okpalobi v. Foster,
244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc), to support denying the plaintiffs' standing to challenge a civil
provision); Summit Med. Assocs. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11 th Cir. 1999)).
328. See, e.g., Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 440-41 483 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (invalidating the federal "partial-birth abortion" ban for lacking a health exception and finding it
"unnecessary" to address other issues), aff d in part sub nom. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzalez, 437
F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 2006); R.I. Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 315-16 (D.R.I. 1999).
329. See RI. Med. Soc'y, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 315-16. See also, e.g., Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster,
43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 615 (E.D. La. 1999), affd, 221 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2000). Ironically, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed this ruling just one year before issuing its en banc decision in Okpalobi.
330. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-88 (1992).
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though the 1 named defendants had no enforcement power over that
33
provision.
It is just as appropriate to require the state to defend pre-enforcement
challenges to freestanding, privately enforced provisions that the state has
enacted. The Constitution contemplates judicial review as the means to
ensure governmental accountability. As Erwin Chemerinsky points out,
"The authority for litigation against the government is the Constitution
itself and its assurance of the supremacy of federal law, government
accountability, and due process." 332 In the search for constitutional
accountability in cases of legislative arrogance, courts should unflinchingly
cast light on the government's responsibility, rather than seeking to pin the
blame on as-yet nonexistent private litigants, or on an individual, "rogue"
official in the service of an obvious fiction. 333 This will require courts to
reject overly formalistic readings of case or controversy requirements and
the Ex parte Young doctrine. But in doing so, courts will be vindicating, not
violating, basic constitutional principles.
V. CONCLUSION
Our Constitution promises that the government may not infringe the
constitutional rights of its citizens. For that promise to have any meaning,
the government must be held accountable for such infringements. Under
our constitutional system, the judiciary exists as a check to ensure that
accountability. And yet, through artfully crafted legislation, state
legislatures currently are infringing constitutional rights with impunity,
shirking their constitutional responsibility by manipulating well-established
principles designed to ensure that the government is held to account when
it harms citizens through unconstitutional actions.
Federal courts should stop this trend. Regardless of how sympathetic
an underlying state goal may be, or how frustrated a state may be by the
Supreme Court's decisions, it is far worse to permit state legislative
arrogance to go unchecked. The core constitutional principles of federal
331. See id. at 893-94, 898 (addressing the constitutionality of the provision without reference to
standing or sovereign immunity concerns).
332. Chemerinsky, supra note 198, at 1219.
333. Cf. Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibilityfor ConstitutionalTorts, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 225, 225-30 (1986). Whitman argues that courts have become familiar with characterizing wrongs
using the terminology of tort law, which leads courts to tend to couch constitutional harms in terms of
an individual's behavior being inconsistent with community norms. As Whitman notes, this diverts
attention from the governmental institution that promulgates the harm. See id. Courts, including the
Supreme Court, are thus likely to overlook the unique attributes of constitutional harms inflicted by
governmental institutions. See id. at 257-60.
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supremacy and the balancing of power among the branches of government
are threatened by these actions, which invite an anarchy in which
individual rights are constantly subject to shifting majorities. To take
constitutional responsibility is to share constitutional authority the way our
system of government intends, not to arrogate power because of
disagreements with how other branches have exercised theirs. The federal
courts should ensure that states who engage in legislative arrogance are
held accountable by hearing pre-enforcement challenges to these acts. The
legitimacy of such challenges is supported by a straightforward application
of Article HI case or controversy principles and the Ex parte Young
doctrine, as well as by basic constitutional norms.
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